JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
A judge’s complete protection from personal liability for exercising judicial functions.
Judicial immunity protects judges from liability for monetary damages in civil court, for
acts they perform pursuant to their judicial function. A judge generally has IMMUNITY from civil damages if he or she had jurisdiction over the subject matter in issue. This means that a judge has immunity for acts relating to cases
before the court, but not for acts relating to cases
beyond the court’s reach. For example, a crimi-
nal court judge would not have immunity if he
or she tried to influence proceedings in a juve-
nile court.
Some states codify the judicial immunity
doctrine in statutes. Most legislatures, including
Congress, let court decisions govern the issue.
Judicial immunity is a common-law con-
cept, derived from judicial decisions. It origi-
nated in the courts of medieval Europe to
discourage persons from attacking a court deci-
sion by suing the judge. Losing parties were
required instead to take their complaints to an
appellate court. The idea of protecting judges
from civil damages was derived from this basic
tenet and served to solidify the independence of
the judiciary. It became widely accepted in the
English courts and in the courts of the United
States.
Judicial immunity was first recognized by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Randall v. Brigham,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 19 L. Ed. 285 (1868). In
Randall the Court held that an attorney who had
been banned from the PRACTICE OF LAW by a
judge could not sue the judge over the disbar-
ment. In its opinion, the Court stated that a
judge was not liable for judicial acts unless they
were done “maliciously or corruptly.”
In Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20
L. Ed. 646 (1871), the U.S. Supreme Court clari-
fied judicial immunity. Joseph H. Bradley had
brought suit seeking civil damages against
George P. Fisher, a former justice of the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia. Bradley had
been the attorney for John H. Suratt, who was
tried in connection with the assassination of
President ABRAHAM LINCOLN. In Suratt’s trial,
after Fisher had called a recess, Bradley accosted
Fisher “in a rude and insulting manner” and
accused Fisher of making insulting comments
from the bench. Suratt’s trial continued, and the
jury was unable to reach a verdict.
Immediately after discharging the jury, Fisher
ordered from the bench that Bradley’s name be
stricken from the rolls of attorneys authorized to
practice before the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia. Bradley sued Fisher for damages
relating to lost work as a result of the order. At
trial, Bradley attempted to introduce evidence in
his favor, but Fisher’s attorney objected to each
item, and the judge excluded each item. After
three failed attempts to present evidence, the trial
court directed the jury to deliver a verdict in favor
of Fisher.
On appeal by Bradley, the U.S. Supreme
