IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

The Iran-Contra Affair involved a secret foreign policy operation directed by White House officials in the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)
under President RONALD REAGAN. The operation
had two goals: first, to sell arms to Iran in the
hope of winning the release of U.S. hostages in
Lebanon, and second, to illegally divert profits
from these sales to the Contra rebels fighting to
overthrow the Sandinista government of
Nicaragua. Discovery of the secret operation, in
1986, triggered a legal and political uproar that
rocked the Reagan administration. The numer-
ous related investigations and indictments did
not end until 1993 and even then questions
remained about the roles of senior White House
officials in this arms-for-hostages deal.

The affair came to public attention on
November 3, 1986, when a Lebanese publica-
tion, Al-Shiraa, first reported that the United
States had sold arms to Iran. The news was
shocking because the Reagan administration
had previously denounced Iran as a supporter of
international TERRORISM. Shortly after the Al-
Shiraa report Nicaraguan forces downed a U.S.
plane and captured its pilot. The pilot’s confes-
sion led to a second startling revelation: a private
U.S. enterprise was supplying arms to Contra rebels.

The enterprise seemed designed to circum-
vent the will of Congress. In the early 1980s,
after bitter debate, Congress had passed legisla-
tion barring the use of federal monies to over-
throw the Nicaraguan government. Through a
series of amendments to appropriations bills
enacted between 1982 and 1986, known as the
Boland amendments, this legislation blocked the
Reagan administration’s wish to go on support-
ing the Contras.Now it was revealed that private
citizens and private monies were being used to
this end. Moreover, the operation was being
directed from within the White House by the
NSC—the president’s advisory cabinet on secu-
rity affairs and covert operations. Directing the
Iran-Contra enterprise were Vice Admiral John
Poindexter, national security assistant, and his
subordinate, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North,
deputy director for political-military affairs.
Each branch of government quickly began a
separate investigation into the affair. In Decem-
ber 1986, President Reagan issued an EXECUTIVE
ORDER creating the Tower Commission, named
after its chair, John Tower. The purpose of this
three-member review board was to recommend
changes in executive policy regarding the future
roles and procedures of the NSC staff. Reagan’s
creation of the commission was a tacit disavowal
of presidential knowledge or responsibility for
the actions of Iran-Contra participants.
Although admitting that his administration had
negotiated secretly with Iran in order to free the
hostages in Lebanon, he publicly denied know-
ing about the arms-supplying enterprise
directed by his own NSC staff.

Simultaneously, the Senate and the House of
Representatives each created a select Iran-
Contra committee. These committees were
charged with holding hearings to uncover facts
and to recommend legislative action to prevent
future illegal foreign policy operations. In their
zeal to fully expose the affair, the committees granted limited forms of IMMUNITY to several key witnesses. This decision proved to be a
mixed blessing. On the one hand, it provided
Congress and the U.S. public with a wider
understanding of the affair through televised
hearings (which also made a public figure out of
Lieutenant Colonel North). But it ultimately
proved harmful to efforts to prosecute North
and Vice Admiral Poindexter.

The attorney general requested that an INDEPENDENT COUNSEL be appointed to investigate wrongdoing. An independent counsel is a special appointee who is given the authority to bring indictments and pursue convictions. For this important role, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Independent Counsel Division, selected Lawrence E. Walsh, a former AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION president and former federal judge. Legal authority for Walsh’s appointment existed in provisions of the Ethics in Government Act (Pub. L.No. 95-521 [Oct. 26, 1978], 92 Stat. 1824 [28 U.S.C.A. § 592(c) (1) (1982)]).

The various Iran-Contra investigations soon uncovered a plethora of legal violations. The
covert arms sales to Iran violated numerous
statutes that restricted the transfer of arms to
nations that support international terrorism,
principally the Arms Export Control Act of 1976
(Pub. L. No. 90-629, 89 Stat. 1320 [22 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2751–2796c (1989 Supp.)]). By failing to
report the Iranian sales to Congress, the Reagan
administration had ignored reporting provi-
sions in the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act
(Pub. L. No. 96-450, tit. IV, 407(b) (1), 94 Stat.
1981 [50 U.S.C.A. § 413 (1982)]). That law
required the president to notify Congress in a
timely fashion of any “significant anticipated
intelligence activity, and to make a formal writ-
ten “finding” (declaration) that each covert
operation was important to national security.
Three findings were at issue in the Iran-Contra
affair: (1) Not only had President Reagan failed
to report the first arms sales, but he had also
authorized them through Israeli intermediaries
by “oral” findings that were not authorized by
intelligence oversight statutes. (2) The CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) justified a second
shipment of arms to the Iranians through a
“retroactive” finding issued by the CIA’s general
counsel; Poindexter admitted destroying this
finding. (3) President Reagan admitted signing a
third written finding, in January 1986, but later
claimed he had never read it.

The investigations took two turns. Congress and the Tower Commission completed their
hearings and issued reports and independent counsel Walsh pursued wide-ranging indictments against several individuals, including Reagan administration officials. In 1987, Congress issued the 690-page Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair (S. Rep. No. 216, H.R. Rep. No. 433, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 423). The report charged the
president with failing to execute his constitu-
tional duty to uphold the law. However, its con-
clusion did not support changes in legislation to
prevent a future breakdown of legality in foreign
policy affairs. Iran-Contra, the report said,
reflected a failure of people rather than of laws.
This assertion pointed to a central political dis-
agreement about the affair: although Democrats
were harsh in their condemnation, Republican
members of Congress tended to view the inves-
tigation itself as an effort by Democrats to inter-
fere with a Republican president’s foreign policy.
In like fashion, the 1987 report downplayed any need for legislation to
revise national security decision making. Instead,
it criticized Reagan’s lax management style.
After the reports, attention shifted to the
independent counsel’s investigation. In March
1988, GRAND JURY indictments were brought
against North, Poindexter, Richard V. Secord,
and Albert Hakim. The indictments included
four distinct charges: conspiring to obstruct the
U.S. government; diverting public funds from
arms sales to Iran to aid the Contras in
Nicaragua; stealing public funds for private
ends; and lying to Congress and other govern-
ment officials.With the exception of the routine
criminal charge of theft, the most serious points
in the indictments essentially accused the defen-
dants of conducting a private foreign policy in
violation of constitutional norms.

Before independent counsel Walsh could
begin his prosecutions, several pretrial delays
took place. First, the law providing for an inde-
pendent counsel was challenged. The Reagan
administration, joining a number of its former
officials who were subject to other independent
counsel investigations, argued that the law
unconstitutionally denied the president impor-
tant executive power. In June 1988, the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected this argument and
upheld the law’s constitutionality in Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 101 L.
Ed. 2d 569. Next, the first four Iran-Contra defendants—Poindexter, North, Secord, and Hakim—moved for dismissal of the charges brought by Walsh. They argued that their compelled testimony before the joint congressional committees had violated their FIFTH AMENDMENT rights against SELF-INCRIMINATION. In United States v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1988), U.S. district judge Gerhard Gesell denied the motion, clearing the way for the trials to begin.

Soon, a more serious obstacle hampered
Walsh’s prosecution: the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
and the White House refused to release classified
information crucial to the case on the grounds
that it was vital to national security.Without this
information,much of Walsh’s case collapsed. He
was forced to dismiss the broader charges of
conspiracy and diversion—the crux of the Iran Contra Affair’s illegality—and to pursue instead the less serious charges remaining in the indictments.
Walsh won a conviction against Lieutenant
Colonel North on May 4, 1989, for obstructing
Congress, destroying documents, and accepting
an illegal gratuity (United States v. North, 713 F.
Supp. 1448 [D.D.C.]). The trial disclosed evi-
dence that suggested that both Presidents
Ronald Reagan and GEORGE H. W. BUSH had
greater roles in the Iran-Contra Affair than
either the Tower Commission or the congres-
sional committees had concluded. During the
trial, North’s attorneys failed in an attempt to
subpoena Reagan, whom North would later
squarely blame for complete knowledge of the
affair, in his memoir Under Fire: An American
Story. Subsequent to the conviction, Judge Gesell denied two motions for an acquittal and a mistrial. Gesell sentenced North to two years’ PROBATION, 1,200 hours of community service, and a $150,000 fine.

North appealed. On July 20, 1990, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
in U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d. 843 ((D.C. Cir. 1990),
suspended all three of North’s felony convic-
tions and completely overturned his conviction
for destroying classified documents. At issue was
North’s earlier testimony before Congress. The
appellate ruling was based on the same reason-
ing as the contention made by North, Poindex-
ter, Secord, and Hakim before their trials:
Congress’s decision to grant immunity to North
had clashed with the Fifth Amendment protec-
tion of witnesses against self-incrimination. The
appeals court directed the trial court to reexam-
ine North’s earlier testimony. Some critics
argued that the appellate ruling, written by
Judge Laurence Silberman, smacked of partisan-
ship; Silberman had been, in 1980, cochair of the
Reagan-Bush foreign policy advisory group.
Walsh pressed on, but on September 16, 1991,
Judge Gesell dropped all charges against North
(North, 920 F. 2d 940 [D.C. Cir. 1990], cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 941, 111 S. Ct. 2235, 114 L. Ed.
2d 477 [1991]).

Vice Admiral Poindexter’s trial was similar
to North’s. After failing to win release of classi-
fied subpoenaed materials, Walsh narrowed his
case to charges that Poindexter had provided
false information and made false statements to
Congress. Unlike North’s attorneys, however,
Poindexter’s successfully subpoenaed former
president Reagan, who became the first former
president ordered to testify in a criminal trial
regarding the conduct of affairs during his
administration. Reagan provided an eight-hour
videotaped deposition. However, Poindexter failed to win access to the former president’s
diaries, which his attorneys argued were crucial to Poindexter’s defense.

Walsh’s prosecution of Poindexter succeeded
through a PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.In
testimony for the prosecution, Lieutenant
Colonel North said that he had seen Poindexter
destroy a high-level secret document, signed by
the president, which described the Iran arms
sales as an exchange-for-hostages deal. North
also claimed that he lied to members of Con-
gress at Poindexter’s direction. Other testimony
revealed that Poindexter had erased some five
thousand computer files after the Iran-Contra
story broke in the media in November 1986.
On April 7, 1990, jurors convicted Poindex-
ter on all five of the counts in the indictment.
Sentenced on June 11, 1990, to six months in
prison, he became the first Iran-Contra defen-
dant to receive a prison term, but remained free
pending his appeal. Here, as in North, the con-
viction was overturned. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia ruled that Poindex-
ter’s testimony before Congress had been
unfairly used against him in his trial (Poindexter,
951 F. 2d 369 [D.C. Cir. 1991]).

If the reversal of convictions against Poindexter and North represented a defeat to
Walsh, so did several plea bargains that his office secured in the late 1980s. Critics had expected more serious convictions to result from his intense investigation. In March 1988, former national security adviser Robert McFarlane
pleaded guilty to four misdemeanor counts of
withholding information from Congress and
was fined a modest amount. Two private fund-
raisers, Carl Channell and Richard Miller,
pleaded guilty to using a tax-exempt organiza-
tion to raise money to purchase arms for the
Contras. Channell was sentenced to probation
only; Miller was ordered to do minimal public
service. In November 1989, Secord, Hakim, and
a corporation owned by Hakim all pleaded
guilty to relatively minor counts. As Walsh’s
office persevered, it could show little in terms of
prosecutions, and Republicans in Congress
derided the multimillion-dollar investigation as
a vindictive exercise in partisan politics.
Then, in 1992,Walsh brought an indictment
against the highest-ranking Reagan administra-
tion official to be charged in the Iran-Contra
Affair: Caspar W. Weinberger, former defense
secretary. Weinberger was indicted on June 16,
1992, on five felony counts: one count of
obstructing the congressional committees’
investigations; two counts of making false state-
ments to investigators working for Walsh and Congress; and two counts of perjury related to his congressional testimony. Penalties for each count were a maximum of five years in prison and up to $250,000 in fines.

Walsh based the case on evidence gathered from notes that Weinberger had written while
serving for six years in the Reagan administration. These nearly illegible notes, scrawled on 1,700 small scraps of paper, formed a personal diary.Weinberger had given them to the LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, with the requirement that no one
could read them without his personal consent.
Throughout Iran-Contra investigations, Wein-
berger had repeatedly testified to Congress and
the Tower Commission that he had argued
against the arms-for-hostages scheme when it
was discussed by White House officials. Walsh
did not make Weinberger’s involvement an issue
in the 1992 indictment. Instead, he zeroed in on
Weinberger’s testimony under oath that he had
not kept notes or a personal diary during the
arms sale period. The discovery of the notes in
the Library of Congress suggested that Wein-
berger had presented false testimony.

On June 19, 1992, Weinberger pleaded not
guilty to all five felony charges. Judge Thomas F.
Hogan set a tentative trial date of November 2,
1992, one day before the presidential election.
This timing raised the question of whether
Weinberger’s trial would cause political embar-
rassment for President George H.W. Bush, who
was campaigning against BILL CLINTON. Four
days before the election, Walsh announced a
new indictment against Weinberger. It centered
on a note that had been written by Weinberger
about a 1986 White House meeting and that
seemed to contradict Bush’s claim that as vice
president he had not been involved in the arms-
for-hostages decision making. Senate Republi-
cans, angered by the indictment, asked the
Justice Department to name an independent
counsel to investigate whether the Clinton campaign had been behind the indictment. Attorney General WILLIAM P. BARR denied the request.
The case progressed no further. In a surprise
reprieve on Christmas Eve, 1992, President Bush
pardoned Weinberger and five others implicated
in the Iran-Contra Affair. The pardon cited
Weinberger’s record of public and military serv-
ice, his recent ill health, and a desire to put Iran-
Contra to rest. Bush also pardoned former
assistant SECRETARY OF STATE Elliot Abrams;
former CIA officials Clair George, Duane Clar-
ridge, and Alan Fiers; and former national secu-
rity adviser McFarlane. Bush deemed all six men
patriots and said their prosecution represented
not law enforcement but the “criminalization of
policy differences,” essentially repeating his
long-standing argument that Iran-Contra was
really a case where Democrats had pursued a
political witch-hunt to punish Republican offi-
cials over disagreements on foreign policy
(Grant of Exec. Clemency, Proclamation No.
6518, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145).

Reaction to the pardons divided along party
lines, with Republicans hailing Bush and
Democrats criticizing him. Walsh accused Bush
of furthering a cover-up and thwarting judicial
process. He had long maintained that top Rea-
gan administration officials had engaged in a
cover-up to protect their president. Now, he
promised, Bush would become the subject of his
remaining investigation.

Bush’s only testimony had taken place in a
January 1988 videotaped deposition. An unset-
tled question was why Bush’s personal diaries
were withheld from prosecutors for six years;
their existence was only disclosed to the inde-
pendent counsel’s office following the 1992 pres-
idential election. Throughout 1993, Walsh
sought to interview the former president but was
blocked by Bush’s attorneys. Bush consistently
insisted on placing limits on any interview.Walsh
refused those limits, complained that Bush was
stalling the investigation, and ultimately aban-
doned the attempt to question Bush.

Walsh also chose, in 1993, not to indict
another high-ranking Reagan administration
official, former attorney general EDWIN MEESE
III. In 1986, Meese said that Reagan did not
know about the arms sales to Iran. Walsh con-
tended that the statement was false, but admit-
ted that building a criminal case against Meese
would have been difficult: too much time had
passed and could therefore have bolstered mem-
ory loss as a defense.
On August 6, 1992, after six-and-a-half years
and $35.7 million, Walsh concluded the Iran-
Contra investigation and submitted his final
report to the special court that had appointed
him. By 1993, the Iran-Contra Affair seemed
over, in one sense. The STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
on crimes that may have been committed during
it had expired, and no further prosecution would be forthcoming.However, additional revelations followed as historians sifted through emerging evidence, notably in the memoirs of key participants. The lessons of the affair continued to be debated. Some said that Iran-Contra exposed a pattern of zealous disregard, by the EXECUTIVE BRANCH, of legislative constraint on foreign policy, that dated back to the VIETNAM WAR. Others took the view held by the Reagan and Bush administrations: namely, that nothing terrible had happened.

IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR