HAMMER V. DAGENHART
At the beginning of the twentieth century, U.S. reformers sought to end the practice of child
labor. Young children were sent into factories
and mines to work long hours for low wages.
Aside from the physical demands placed upon
children, labor robbed them of a chance to
obtain an education. Some states enacted laws to
regulate child labor, but others ignored these
efforts and found competitive advantages in
having a cheap supply of labor. Congress finally
responded in 1916, when it passed the Keating-
Owen Child Labor Act, of September 1, 1916, c.
432, 39 Stat. 675. The statute prohibited the use
of interstate commerce for goods and materials
made with child labor. Congress believed that
the Constitution’s COMMERCE CLAUSE permit-
ted it to act to regulate child labor, but the U.S.
Supreme Court thought differently. In Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L.
Ed. 1101 (1918), the Court ruled the act uncon-
stitutional, basing its decision on a constricted
interpretation of the Commerce Clause and an
expansive view of state governments’ powers.
The decision provoked Justice OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES to write one of the most significant dis-
senting opinions in the history of the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Roland H. Dagenhart filed a lawsuit in
North Carolina on behalf of his sons Reuben
and John, challenging the Keating-Owen Act.
Under the provisions of the law, his two sons
would have been barred from working in a cot-
ton mill, as one son was under 14-years old and
the older son was under 16-years of age. Dagen-
hart asked the U.S. District Court to strike down
the law as unconstitutional as a violation of the
Commerce Clause and the TENTH AMENDMENT.
The relevant part of the law prohibited the ship-
ment of goods in interstate or foreign commerce
if “within thirty days prior to the time of
removal of such product” children had been
employed or permitted to help make them. The
law applied to children under the age of 16 who
worked in mines; to children under the age of 14
who worked in mills, canneries, workshops, fac-
tories or manufacturing establishments; and to
children between 14 and 16 years of age who
worked more than eight hours per day, more
than six days in any week, or after 7 P.M. or
before 6 A.M. These provisions effectively barred
the Dagenhart sons from working and thereby
deprived the family of needed income. The dis-
trict court agreed with Dagenhart and held the
act unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
upheld the district court’s ruling. Justice
WILLIAM DAY, in his majority opinion, agreed
that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the
power to regulate commerce among the states
and with foreign countries. However, the power
to regulate did not mean that Congress had the
power to prohibit certain commerce. Day
acknowledged that prior Court rulings had
upheld federal laws that banned the movement
of certain goods in interstate commerce but
these decisions rested “upon the character of the
particular subjects” at issue. In Champion v.
Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 321, 47 L. Ed.
492 (1903), the Court had upheld a law that
banned the movement of lottery tickets in inter-
state commerce. In Hipolite Egg Co. v. United
States, 220 U. S. 45, 31 Sup. Ct. 364, 55 L. Ed. 364
(1911) the Court sustained the constitutionality
of the Pure Food and Drug Act, which prohib-
ited the shipping of impure foods and drugs in
interstate commerce. The Court had also upheld
the MANN ACT in Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S.
308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281, 57 L. Ed. 523 (1913). This
law prohibited the movement of women in
interstate commerce for the purposes of prosti-
tution. Finally, the Court had sustained a federal
law that regulated the shipment of intoxicating
liquors in interstate commerce. Justice Day
noted that in this decision, Clark Distilling Co. v.
Western Maryland Railway Co., 242 U. S. 311, 37
