GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT

GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, is a 1963 U.S. Supreme
Court decision that established an indigent criminal defendant’s right, under the SIXTH
AMENDMENT of the U.S. Constitution, to counsel in state criminal trials.

In 1961, Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with breaking into and
entering a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor, a combination of offenses that
constituted a felony under Florida law. He could not afford a lawyer, and he requested to have one appointed by the court. Nearly twenty years earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court had held in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed.
1595 (1942), that an ordinary person could do
an adequate job of defending himself or herself.
A court-appointed lawyer was required only if
the defendant had mental or physical deficiencies,
the case was unusually complicated, or the
case involved “special circumstances.” None of
these exceptions applied to Gideon, the Florida
trial court ruled, and thus his request for counsel
was denied.
Gideon conducted his own defense and was
found guilty of the charges. He then filed a
handwritten petition with the Supreme Court of
Florida, seeking to overturn his conviction on
the ground that the trial court’s refusal to
appoint an attorney for him denied him the
rights “guaranteed by the Constitution and the BILL OF RIGHTS by the United States Government.”
The state supreme court denied Gideon’s
petition.
While in prison, Gideon, using law books
available to him, drafted a petition for writ of
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. (The petition
is the legal document in which a person
requests the Supreme Court to hear an appeal.
The Court has the discretion to accept or decline
the appeal.) According to Anthony Lewis’s
acclaimed book on the case, Gideon’s Trumpet
(1964), in the handwritten petition Gideon
stated that it “just was not fair” that he had no
lawyer at his trial. The petition was granted, and
ABE FORTAS, who would later serve as an associate
justice on the Court, was appointed to argue
Gideon’s case.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme
Court overruled Betts, holding the guarantee of
counsel to be a fundamental right under the U.S.
Constitution. The Court ruled that the DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
required that the Sixth Amendment,
which guarantees indigent defendants the RIGHT
TO COUNSEL in federal criminal proceedings, be
interpreted to include indigent defendants in
state criminal trials. In his majority opinion, Justice
HUGO L. BLACK wrote, “[R]eason and reflection
require us to recognize that in our . . .
system of criminal justice, any person hailed
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided.”
Black further pointed out that the
government hires attorneys to prosecute defendants,
and individuals charged with crimes who
are financially unable to hire attorneys to defend
themselves, both “strong indications . . . that
lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not
luxuries.”
Gideon was later retried with a courtappointed
lawyer representing him and was
found not guilty.
Following Gideon, it was unclear whether
the decision applied only to indigent defendants
facing felony convictions and not to individuals
charged with lesser crimes. Nine years later, that
issue was clarified in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972).
In Argersinger, the Supreme Court expanded its
holding in Gideon, ruling that the Sixth Amendment
right to appointed counsel extended to
misdemeanor cases in which the person charged
may face imprisonment, unless the defendant
makes a “knowing and intelligent waiver” of his
or her right to counsel. The Court concluded
that an accused in a misdemeanor trial likewise
has a strong need for representation and that
Gideon should apply “to any criminal trial,
where an accused is deprived of his liberty.”
Argersinger was limited a few years later by
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S. Ct. 1158, 59 L.
Ed. 2d 383 (1979). In Scott, the Supreme Court
held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
extends only to cases where “actual imprisonment”
is imposed, and not to cases where the
“mere threat of imprisonment” exists (where the
crime charged authorizes a possible jail sentence).
FURTHER READINGS
Lentine, John A. 2003. “Gideon v. Wainwright at Forty—
Fulfilling the Promise?” American Journal of Trial Advocacy
26 (spring): 613–24.
Meares, Tracey L. 2003. “What’s Wrong with Gideon?” University
of Chicago Law Review 70 (winter): 215–31.
CROSS-REFERENCES
Criminal Procedure; Due Process of Law; Public Defender.