FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ASSEMBLY
The right to associate with others for the purpose of engaging in constitutionally protected activities.
The right to associate is not an independent constitutional right but is derived from and dependent on the FIRST AMENDMENT guarantees of FREEDOM OF SPEECH and expression. It is protected only to the extent that it is asserted in conjunction with a First Amendment right.
However, some legal scholars maintain that freedom of association is more fundamental than the rights enumerated in the Constitution because without it those other rights have little meaning.
One early case to recognize freedom of asso-
ciation was NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488
(1958). In Patterson, the Supreme Court held
that a lower court’s order compelling the NAACP
to disclose records containing the names and
addresses of its Alabama members violated the
group’s right to associate freely. The Court rec-
ognized freedom of association as an adjunct to
the NAACP’s free speech rights and held that the
freedom to associate for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas is inseparable from the freedom
of speech.
General types of association unrelated to
First Amendment rights are not protected by the
Constitution. For instance, in City of Dallas v.
Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 104 L. Ed.
2d 18 (1989), the Court held that a city ordi-
nance limiting adult entrance into teenage dance
halls did not violate the associational rights of
either the adults or the minors. The association
of adults and minors in a social setting does not
fall within the purview of any rights protected
by the First Amendment and therefore is not a
constitutionally protected activity.
The activities of groups organized to pursue
economic activity are sometimes protected if the
individuals have come together to advance
beliefs or ideas. Generally, the Court’s decisions
in this area depend on whether the economic
activities are found to be sufficiently expressive
to invoke First Amendment protection. In
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
102 S. Ct. 3409, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1215 (1982), the
NAACP was held not liable for economic dam-
age suffered by merchants in a boycott it had
sponsored. The boycott was a legal, nonviolent
action against white merchants to pressure them
to comply with CIVIL RIGHTS laws. The Court
found that though clearly an economic activity,
it was primarily designed to advance the
NAACP’s political beliefs in civil rights. This
added purpose gave the boycott an expressive
character sufficient to warrant First Amendment
protection. On the other hand, an economic
boycott that is not intended to express political
ideas or beliefs is not protected under the First
Amendment. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 110 S. Ct. 768, 107
L. Ed. 2d 851 (1990), the Court found that a
boycott organized by trial lawyers in an effort to
secure increased compensation for their repre-
sentation of indigent clients was a fundamen-
tally economic activity that did not rise to the
level of expressive conduct contemplated by the
