CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION

CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION

Questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom in any significant way, thus requiring that the person be advised of his or her applicable constitutional rights.

In the landmark decision MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court set standards for law enforcement officers to follow when attempting to interrogate suspects whom they hold in custody. Suspects who are subject to custodial interrogation must be warned that they have the right to remain silent; that any statements that they make may be used as evidence against them; that they have the right to an attorney; and that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for them prior to any questioning, if they so desire. Under Miranda, unless those warnings are given, no evidence obtained during the interrogation may be used against the accused.

Since Miranda was decided, state and federal courts have struggled with a number of issues with regard to its application, including: when a suspect is deemed to be in custody and thus entitled to the warnings required by Miranda; and when a suspect will be deemed to have waived the right to have an attorney present during questioning. Some recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have attempted to answer these difficult questions.

In Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1994), the Court considered whether a police officer’s subjective and undisclosed opinion concerning whether a person who had been questioned had been a suspect was relevant in determining whether that person had been in custody and thus entitled to the Miranda warnings. In 1982, Robert Stansbury was convicted of first-degree murder, rape, KIDNAPPING, and a lewd act on a child under the age of 14. The morning after ten-year-old Robyn Jackson had disappeared from a Baldwin Park, California, playground, a witness in Pasadena, California, had observed a large man leaving a turquoise car and throwing some-thing into a nearby flood-control channel. The witness called the police, who discovered Jackson’s body in the channel. She had been raped, strangled, and struck on the head with a blunt instrument. The police later learned that Jackson had talked to two ice-cream truck drivers, one of whom was Stansbury, shortly before she disappeared. Officers went to Stansbury’s home and asked Stansbury to go to the police station to answer some questions concerning their investigation into Jackson’s murder. Stansbury agreed and accepted a ride to the station in a police car.

At the police station, Stansbury was questioned about his whereabouts and activities on the day Jackson’s body was discovered. The police did not read him the Miranda warnings at the time. Stansbury told the police that he had talked to the girl, that he had returned to his trailer a few hours later, and that he had left around midnight in his roommate’s turquoise car. The car matched the description given by the witness. Stansbury also admitted that he previously had been convicted of rape, kidnapping, and CHILD MOLESTATION. The detective interviewing Stansbury then terminated the conversation and read Stansbury the Miranda warnings. Stansbury was later charged with first-degree murder and other crimes.

At a PRETRIAL CONFERENCE, Stansbury moved to suppress all of the statements that he had made at the station, as well as the evidence that had been discovered as a result of those statements. The trial court denied his motion, ruling that Stansbury had not been in custody—and thus that he had not been entitled to the Miranda warnings—until he had mentioned the turquoise car. Before that point in the interview, the court reasoned, Stansbury had not been considered a suspect. Based on that conclusion, the trial court permitted introduction of the statements that Stansbury had made before he had mentioned the car. Stansbury was convicted on all charges and was sentenced to death for firstdegree murder.

On appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed Stansbury’s conviction, rejecting the “in-custody” claim that he had raised in the trial court. The state supreme court, applying an incustody legal standard based on whether the investigation has focused on the subject, agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that suspicion had focused on Stansbury only after he mentioned driving the turquoise car on the night of the crime. Therefore, the court held, Stansbury had not been subject to custodial interrogation before that time, and in turn Miranda warnings had not been required, and his statements were admissible.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. In a per curiam decision (a brief, unanimous, and unsigned opinion), the Court held that “an officer’s subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the assessment [of] whether the person is in custody.” Instead, according to the Court, the key inquiry should be whether the individual had been placed under formal arrest, or whether the restraint placed on the individual’s freedom of movement rose to the level of a formal arrest. The Court further noted that the “initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogation officers or the person being questioned.” So long as an officer’s subjective view that an individual being questioned is a suspect is not disclosed to the individual, the officer’s view has no bearing on the in-custody issue. If the officer’s knowledge or beliefs are communicated to the individual being questioned, the Court stated, that knowledge or those beliefs are relevant only to the extent that the individual “would gauge the breadth of his or her ‘freedom of action.’ ” But a statement from the officer that the individual is the prime suspect, in and of itself, is not “dispositive of the custody issue.”

In Stansbury, the California Supreme Court had not analyzed the in-custody issue based on these principles. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the objective facts surrounding Stansbury’s interrogation supported the trial court’s original conclusion that Stansbury had not been in custody before he mentioned the turquoise car.

The high court tackled another difficult Miranda issue in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d (1994), when it considered the circumstances under which a suspect who was subject to custodial interrogation has validly waived the right to have an attorney present during questioning. In an earlier decision, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), the Court had held that such a waiver must be “knowing and intelligent.” Furthermore, the Court had made clear in Edwards that police officers must immediately stop questioning a suspect who clearly asserts the right to have legal counsel present during the interrogation.

Edwards applied only when a suspect clearly
asserted the right to have counsel present; it did
not provide guidance to officers when a suspect
made an ambiguous or equivocal request for
counsel. Addressing that situation, some jurisdictions
had held that any mention of counsel,
no matter how ambiguous, required that questioning
cease. Other courts had attempted to
define a threshold standard of clarity, under
which comments that fell below the required
clarity did not invoke the RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
Still other jurisdictions had ruled that questioning
must cease upon any mention of counsel, but
officers were permitted to ask further, narrow
questions to clarify whether the suspect desired
an attorney. In Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court
settled the issue, holding that officers are not
required to cease questioning if a suspect makes
an ambiguous request for counsel. Questioning
may continue until the suspect makes an “unambiguous”
request for an attorney. Furthermore,
the Court held, police officers have no duty to
seek clarification of an ambiguous request.
The case began when Robert Davis, a member
of the U.S. Navy, became a suspect in the
murder of another sailor at the Charleston,
South Carolina, naval base. Davis was interviewed
by the authorities and informed of his
Miranda rights. He waived, orally and in writing,
his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel. But after talking with agents for 90
minutes, he stated, “Maybe I should talk to a
lawyer.” One of the agents asked Davis whether
he wanted an attorney, or whether he was just
making a comment. Davis replied, “No, I’m not
asking for a lawyer.” After a short break, the
agents reminded him of his right to remain
silent and then resumed the questioning. An
hour later, Davis said, “I think I want a lawyer
before I say anything else.” The agents then
stopped the interview.
At his general COURT-MARTIAL, Davis maintained
that the statements made during the
interview after his ambiguous statement concerning
the need to talk with a lawyer should not
be admitted. The court ruled that the ambiguous
statement had not been in the form of a
request for an attorney, and thus the statements
made after it were admissible. Davis was found
guilty of unpremeditated murder and sentenced
to life imprisonment. His conviction was
affirmed by the military appellate court.
The U.S. Supreme Court also affirmed the
conviction.Writing for the majority, Justice SANDRA
DAY O’CONNOR noted that none of the
Court’s previous decisions addressing Miranda
issues required that questioning of a suspect be
terminated if the suspect makes an ambiguous
or equivocal request for counsel. To gain
Miranda protection, she maintained, a suspect
must “unambiguously request counsel,” and the
request must “articulate [the suspect’s] desire to
have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances
would understand the statement to be a request
for an attorney.” She further stated that requiring
questioning to stop when a suspect makes
ambiguous references to requesting an attorney
would transform the Miranda protections into
“wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police
investigative activity.” Police officers, she maintained,
would be forced to end questioning even
if the suspect does not want an attorney, thus
hampering effective law enforcement. Permitting
a mere reference to an attorney to end an
interrogation would require police officers to
“make difficult judgment calls whether the
suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he
hasn’t said so, with the threat of suppression if
they guess wrong.”
In a separate opinion, Justice DAVID H.
SOUTER, joined by Justices HARRY A. BLACKMUN,
JOHN PAUL STEVENS, and RUTH BADER GINSBURG,
concurred in the judgment affirming
Davis’s conviction. In Souter’s view, officers
could constitutionally pose questions to clarify a
suspect’s ambiguous reference for counsel, as
was done in Davis. Souter believed that the
statements given by Davis, after the counsel
issue was clarified, indicated that Davis did not
want an attorney. Nevertheless, Souter disagreed
with the Court’s ruling that the agents could
entirely disregard Davis’s references to wanting
one. He argued that, like the agents in Davis, the
Court should adopt a rule barring officers from
further questioning until they have determined
whether a suspect’s ambiguous statement was
meant as a request for an attorney. According to
Souter, a “timid or verbally inept subject” might
not understand what is required in order for
him or her to stop the interrogation and to consult
with an attorney. If the suspect understands
that a request has been ignored, he or she may
not object further and may see “confession (true
or not) as the only way to end [the] interrogation.”
The Future of Miranda
Miranda and its progeny have long served as
a whipping post for politicians, legal commentators,
and others who perceive the decision as
“coddling criminals.” They argue that the
Miranda warnings impede police officers from
efficiently and effectively doing their jobs by
adding additional layers of unnecessary procedure
to the law enforcement process. Miranda
critics also maintain that the police are punished,
and that society is harmed, when defendants
are set free, because key evidence is
suppressed after being obtained in violation of
the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against un-
Mirandized confessions. Moreover, Miranda
critics contend that criminal suspects seldom
fully understand the meaning or importance of
the rights recited to them. Finally, critics cite
studies indicating that the Miranda decision has
had little effect in reducing the number of confessions
and requests for lawyers made by suspects
in custody.
In 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit fueled long-standing speculation
that Miranda would be overruled when it held
that the admissibility of confessions in federal
court is governed not by Miranda, but by a federal
statute enacted two years after Miranda. The
statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501, provides that a confession
is admissible if voluntarily given, with
the voluntariness of each confession being evaluated
by the “totality of the circumstances” on a
cases-by-case basis, without any requirement
that the defendant be Mirandized. Congress
enacted the statute to overturn Miranda, the
Fourth Circuit wrote, and Congress had the
authority to do so pursuant to its authority to
overrule judicially created RULES OF EVIDENCE
that are not mandated by the Constitution.
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir.
1999).
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. In a 7-2
opinion authored by Chief Justice WILLIAM
REHNQUIST, the Court wrote that whether or
not it agreed with Miranda, the principles of
STARE DECISIS weigh heavily against overruling
it then. While the Court has overruled other
precedents when subsequent cases have undermined
their doctrinal underpinnings, that has
not happened to the Miranda decision, which
the Court said “has become embedded in routine
police practice to the point where the warnings
have become part of our national culture.”
Although a few guilty defendants may sometimes
go free as the result of the application of
the Miranda rule, the Court observed, experience
shows that the totality-of-the-circumstances
test set forth in Section 3501 is more
difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers
and courts to apply in a consistent manner.
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.
Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000).
The Court said that a contrary conclusion is
not required by the fact that it has subsequently
made exceptions to the Miranda rule.No constitutional
rule is immutable, much less immune
from the sort of refinements Miranda has
undergone to adapt to the needs and realities of
law enforcement. Moreover, the Court emphasized,
these exceptions have reduced some of the
law enforcement inefficiencies that Miranda
critics were predicting would undermine the
efficiency of criminal investigations, as the
Miranda warnings are now often provided in a
rote and perfunctory manner during arrest and
custodial interrogation. “If anything,” Rehnquist
wrote, “subsequent cases have reduced the
impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law
enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s
core ruling that unwarned statements may not
be used as evidence in the prosecution’s case in
chief.”
Dickerson surprised many observers, not
only because the Court declined to overrule
Miranda, but also because Chief Justice William
Rehnquist authored the opinion upholding
Miranda, even suggesting that Miranda had
become so “embedded” in the nation’s
JURISPRUDENCE as to be unlikely to be overturned
in the foreseeable future. Most observers
consider Rehnquist to be one of the Court’s
more conservative members. His opinions are
frequently joined by fellow conservatives, Justices
ANTONIN SCALIA and CLARENCE THOMAS,
both of whom dissented in Dickerson. On any
number of other issues, civil libertarians have
assailed the chief justice for what they regard as
his narrow reading of the BILL OF RIGHTS. Dickerson
both tempered that criticism and quieted
speculation about the future of Miranda.
FURTHER READINGS
Clymer, Steven D. 2002. “Are Police Free to Disregard
Miranda?” Yale Law Journal 112 (December).
Kenney, Jack. 1998. “Custodial Interrogation, Invocation of
Right to Counsel.” Res Gestae 42 (November–December).
Pearce, Gene A. 2001. “Constitutional Law—Criminal Law:
The United States Supreme Court Affirms the Use of Miranda Rights by Police to Determine the Admissibility
of Statements Made During Custodial Interrogation.”
North Dakota Law Review 77 (winter).
CROSS-REFERENCES
Criminal Procedure; Privilege Against Self-Incrimination;
Right to Counsel; Self-Incrimination.