CURFEW
A curfew is a law, regulation, or ordinance that
forbids particular people or particular classes of
people from being outdoors in public places at
certain specified times of the day.
Juvenile Curfews
Local ordinances and state statutes may
make it unlawful for minors below a certain age
to be on public streets, unless they are accompanied
by a parent or an adult or on lawful and
necessary business on behalf of their parents or
guardians. For example, a Michigan state law
provides that “[n]o minor under the age of 12
years shall loiter, idle or congregate in or on any
public street, highway, alley or park between the
hours of 10 o’clock P.M. and 6 o’clock A.M.,
unless the minor is accompanied by a parent or
guardian, or some adult delegated by the parent
or guardian to accompany the child.” MCLA §
722.751; MSA § 28.342(1). Curfew laws in other
states and cities typically set forth different curfews
for minors of different ages.
Curfew laws and ordinances have been sustained
as necessary to control the presence of
juveniles in public places at nighttime with the
attendant risk of mischief. In re Osman, 109
Ohio App. 3d 731, 672 N.E.2d 1114 (1996).
Courts have found that curfew ordinances promote
the safety and good order of the community
by reducing the incidence of juvenile
criminal activity. Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville,
159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998).
Curfew laws have generally been upheld
against constitutional challenges on FIRST
AMENDMENT and DUE PROCESS grounds.
Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 175 F.
Supp. 2d 1132 (S.D. Ind. 2001). One federal
court held that minors have no fundamental
right to freedom of movement or travel that
protects them from restrictions imposed by curfew
laws. Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188
F.3d 531,(D.C. Cir. 1999). However, a juvenile
curfew ordinance that exempted minors who
had graduated from high school was found to
violate the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE of the
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution.
In re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83, 394 N.E.2d
368, 13 O.O.3d 290 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1978).
In some instances, courts will find particular
language in a juvenile curfew law to be impermissibly
vague under the “void for vagueness”
doctrine (a FIFTH AMENDMENT doctrine that
requires all laws to be sufficiently clear that persons of average intelligence will understand in advance which conduct is prohibited). If possible,
courts will simply delete offending language
from the law so that what remains passes constitutional
muster. For example, one curfew law
allowed the city’s mayor to issue permits for
minors to use public streets during prohibited
times if the mayor found that such use was “consistent
with the public interest.”A California state
court held that that language failed to provide
any standards by which the mayor could lawfully
exercise the discretion to grant permits. The
court deleted the language but said the mayor
could still grant permits when to do so would be
consistent with the purposes of ordinance as
expressly set forth therein. Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
Curfew as a Condition of Probation
State laws typically allow courts to impose
curfews on criminal defendants as a condition of
pre-trial release, and on probationers as a condition
for successful discharge from PROBATION.
Defendants and probationers who are subject to
curfews can be ordered to pay the cost of monitoring
their compliance with the terms of the
order. Curfew violations can result in the revocation
of probation or termination of the pretrial
release bond.
However, curfew orders themselves must be
reasonable, and courts must be careful to
explain the rationale underlying them. Orders
imposing curfews that are harsh or excessive, for
example, have been invalidated. People v. Braun,
177 A.D. 2d 981, 578 N.Y.S.2d (1991). Similarly,
orders that cite no justification for a curfew have
also been overturned. People v Sztuk, 126 A.D. 2d
950, 511 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1987).
Adult Curfews & Strict Scrutiny
Curfews directed at adults touch upon fundamental
constitutional rights and thus are subject
to strict judicial scrutiny. The U. S. Supreme
Court has ruled that “[t]he right to walk the
streets, or to meet publicly with one’s friends for
a noble purpose or for no purpose at all—and to
do so whenever one pleases—is an integral component
of life in a free and ordered society.”
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 US 156,
164, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110, 92 S. Ct 839 (1972).
To satisfy strict-scrutiny analysis, a government-
imposed curfew on adults must be supported
by a compelling state interest that is
narrowly tailored to serve the curfew’s objective.
Court’s are loath to find that an interest
advanced by the government is compelling. The
more justifications that courts find to uphold a
curfew on adults, the more watered-down
becomes the fundamental right to travel and to
associate with others in public places at all times
of the day.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that this
right may be legitimately curtailed when a community
has been ravaged by flood, fire, or disease,
or when its safety and WELFARE are
otherwise threatened. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,
85 S. Ct. 1271, 14 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1965). The California
Court of Appeals cited this ruling in a
case that reviewed an order issued by the city of
Long Beach, California, which declared a state of
emergency and imposed curfews on all adults
(and minors) within the city’s confines after
widespread civil disorder broke out following
the Rodney G. King beating trial, in which four
white Los Angeles police officers were acquitted
of using excessive force in subduing an African-
American motorist following a high-speed traffic
chase. In re Juan C., 28 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 33
Cal. Rptr. 2d 919 (Cal. App. 1994).
“Rioting, looting and burning,” the California
court wrote, “pose a similar threat to the
safety and welfare of a community, and provide
a compelling reason to impose a curfew.” “The
right to travel is a hollow promise when members
of the community face the possibility of
being beaten or shot by an unruly mob if they
attempt to exercise this right,”the court continued,
and “[t]emporary restrictions on the
right. . .are a reasonable means of reclaiming
order from ANARCHY so that all might exercise
their constitutional rights freely and safely.”
