CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson (seated, far right) addresses members of the U.N. Security Council on October 25, 1962. On display are aerial photographs of missile sites in Cuba—proof that the Soviet Union had indeed been building missile sites on the island.

The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was a dangerous moment in the COLD WAR between the United States and the Soviet Union. The actions taken by President John F. Kennedy’s administration prevented the installation of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, just 90 miles from Florida. The crisis also illustrated the limitations of international law,as the United States relied on military actions and threats to accomplish its goal.

The crisis grew out of political changes in
Cuba. In the 1950s, Fidel Castro, a young lawyer, led a guerrilla movement against Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. Batista lost the confidence of the Cuban people and on January 1, 1959, fled the country. Castro became premier of the new government.

At first, the United States supported the Castro government. This changed when Castro seized U.S.-owned sugar estates and cattle ranches in Cuba. The United States subsequently embargoed trade with Cuba, and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) began covert operations to topple Castro. In 1960, Castro openly embraced COMMUNISM and signed Cuba’s first trade agreement with the Soviet Union.

Many Cubans had left the island of Cuba for
the United States following the Castro revolu-
tion. Aided by the United States, a Cuban exile
army was trained for an invasion. Although
most of the planning took place in 1960, when
President DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER was finish-
ing his second term, the final decision to invade
came during the first months of the Kennedy
administration. In April 1961, Cuban exiles
invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The invasion
was a debacle, in part because U.S. air support
that had been promised was not provided. The
exile army was captured.

Convinced that the United States would
attempt another invasion, Castro asked Premier
Nikita Khrushchev, of the Soviet Union, for
nuclear missiles. Khrushchev agreed to what
would be the first deployment of NUCLEAR
WEAPONS outside the Soviet Union. President
Kennedy at first did not believe the Soviets
would follow through on their promise. On
October 14, 1962, however, photographs taken
by reconnaissance planes showed that missile
sites were being built in Cuba. The president convened a small group of trusted advisers, called the Executive Committee of the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (Ex Com). Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY served on Ex Com and became the key adviser to President Kennedy during the crisis.

Military officials advocated bombing the missile sites or invading Cuba.Others argued for
a nuclear strike on Cuba. These ideas were rejected in favor of a naval blockade of Cuba. All
ships attempting to enter Cuba were to be stopped and searched for missiles and related
military material. President Kennedy, believing that the Soviets were using the missiles to test his will, resolved to make the crisis public. Bypassing private, diplomatic procedures, Kennedy went on national television on October 22 and informed the United States of the missile sites,
the naval blockade, and his resolve to take any
action necessary to prevent the missile deployment.
Tension built during the last days of October
as the world awaited the approach of Soviet missile-
bearing ships at the blockade line. If Soviet
ships refused to turn back, it was likely that U.S.
ships would either stop them or sink them. If
that happened, nuclear war seemed probable.
During the crisis, the UNITED NATIONS was
not used as a vehicle for negotiation or mediation.
The United States and the Soviet Union
ignored an appeal by Secretary General U
Thant, of the United Nations, that they reduce
tensions for a few weeks. Instead, the Security
Council of the United Nations became a stage
for both sides to trade accusations. Ambassador
ADLAI STEVENSON, from the United States, presented
photographs of the missile sites to back
up U.S. claims.
On October 24, the crisis began to ease, as 12
Soviet ships on their way to Cuba were, on
orders from Moscow, diverted or halted. However,
construction on the missile sites continued.
On October 26, Premier Khrushchev sent a long,
emotional letter to President Kennedy, claiming
that the missiles were defensive. He implied that
a pledge by the United States not to invade Cuba
would allow him to remove the missiles. President
Kennedy replied, accepting the proposal to
exchange withdrawal of the missiles for the
promise not to invade. He also stated that if the
Soviet Union did not answer his reply in two or
three days, Cuba would be bombed. On October
28, the Soviets announced on Radio Moscow
that the missile sites were being dismantled.
Some historians maintain that President
Kennedy acted heroically to meet a threat to the
security of the United States. Others claim that
the missiles at issue were of limited range and
were purely defensive, and that Kennedy was
reckless in brandishing the threat of nuclear war.
Most agree that the crisis was probably the closest
the Soviet Union and the United States ever
got to nuclear war.
The significance of the crisis to INTERNATIONAL
LAW and the management of international
crises has led to many books, articles, and
scholarly conferences. In October 2002, a conference
hosted by Fidel Castro was held in
Havana. It was a rare event because participants
from the United States, Soviet, and Cuban governments
attended the gathering, sharing their
impressions of what had happened during the
crisis. Participants included former U.S. defense
secretary Robert McNamara, Kennedy presidential
aides Arthur Schlesinger, Ted Sorensen, and
Richard Goodwin, as well as Ethel Kennedy, the
widow of ROBERT KENNEDY.
The Cuban government declassified documents
relating to the crisis and Castro took center
stage, arguing that Khrushchev had inflamed
the situation by lying to Kennedy that there were
no nuclear weapons in Cuba. McNamara confirmed
that most of Kennedy’s advisers, both
military and civilian, had recommended he
attack Cuba. The conference ended with a trip to
a former missile silo on the western side of Cuba.
FURTHER READINGS
Blight, James G., et al. 2002. Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the
Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse. Lanham, Md.:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Diez Acosta, Tomás. 2002. October 1962: The “Missile” Crisis
as Seen from Cuba. New York: Pathfinder.
Garthoff, Raymond. 2002. “The Havana Conference on the
Cuban Missile Crisis.” Cold War International History
Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars.Available online at (accessed May 30,
2003).
O’Neill,William L. 1971. Coming Apart: An Informal History
of America in the 1960s. New York: Quadrangle Books.
CROSS-REFERENCES
Embargo.

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