CONTEMPT

CONTEMPT

An act of deliberate disobedience or disregard for the laws, regulations, or decorum of a public authority, such as a court or legislative body.

Individuals may be cited for contempt when
they disobey an order, fail to comply with a
request, tamper with documents, withhold evi-
dence, interrupt proceedings through their
actions or words, or otherwise defy a public
authority or hold it up to ridicule and disre-
spect. The laws and rules governing contempt
have developed in a piecemeal fashion over time
and give wide discretion to judges and legislative
leaders in determining both what constitutes
contempt and how it is punished.

Contempt of Court
Contempt of court is behavior that opposes
or defies the authority, justice, and dignity of the
court. Contempt charges may be brought
against parties to proceedings; lawyers or other
court officers or personnel; jurors; witnesses; or
people who insert themselves in a case, such as
protesters outside a courtroom. Courts have
great leeway in making contempt charges, and
thus confusion sometimes exists about the dis-
tinctions between types of contempt. Generally,
however, contempt proceedings are categorized
as civil or criminal, and direct or indirect.

Civil contempt generally involves the failure
to perform an act that is ordered by a court as a
means to enforce the rights of individuals or to
secure remedies for parties in a civil action. For
instance, parents who refuse to pay court-
ordered CHILD SUPPORT may be held in con-
tempt of court under civil contempt. Criminal
contempt involves behavior that assaults the dig-
nity of the court or impairs the ability of the
court to conduct its work. Criminal contempt
can occur within a civil or criminal case. For
example, criminal contempt occurs when a wit-
ness or spectator shouts or insults the judge dur-
ing a trial. A civil contempt usually is a violation
of the rights of one person, whereas a criminal
contempt is an offense against society.Courts use
civil contempt as a coercive power, wielding it
only to ask that the contemnor comply with the
courts’ actions. Criminal contempt is punitive;
courts use it to punish parties who have impaired
the courts’ functioning or bruised their dignity.

A direct contempt is an act that occurs in the
presence of the court and is intended to embar-
rass or engender disrespect for the court. Shout-
ing in the courtroom or refusing to answer
questions for a judge or attorney under oath is a
direct contempt. Indirect contempt occurs out-
side the presence of the court, but its intention is
also to belittle, mock, obstruct, interrupt, or
degrade the court and its proceedings. Attempt-
ing to bribe a district attorney is an example of
an indirect contempt. Publishing any material
that results in a contempt charge is an indirect
contempt. Other kinds of indirect contempt
include preventing process service, improperly
communicating to or by jurors, and withholding
evidence. One man was threatened with con-
tempt charges because he had filed more than
350 lawsuits that the judge considered frivolous.
Indirect contempt also may be called construc-
tive or consequential contempt; all three terms
mean the same thing.

The essence of contempt of court is that
the misconduct impairs the fair and efficient
administration of justice. Contempt statutes
generally require that the actions present a
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER that threatens the
administration of justice.

The manner in which an act is committed or
the tone in which words are spoken can deter-
mine whether contempt has occurred. Circum-
stances, such as the context in which the words
were spoken, the tone, the facial expression, the
manner, and the emphasis, are also evaluated by
the court. Failure to complete an act that, if
completed, would tend to bring the court into
disrespect does not preclude the act from being
contemptuous.

Criticisms of the Contempt-of-Court Power
The discretion permitted to judges in deter-
mining what is contempt and how to punish it
has led some legal scholars to argue that the con-
tempt power gives too much authority to judges.
Earl C. Dudley, University of Virginia law pro-
fessor, wrote that in the contempt power, “the
roles of victim, prosecutor and judge are dan-
gerously commingled.”

Much of the criticism focuses on the lack of
restraint or DUE PROCESS in determining pun-
ishments for contempt. In criminal contempt,
the contempt charges become a separate matter,
but they may be heard by the judge who made
them. In addition, the same judge may com-
mence punishment immediately, and the pun-
ishment may be in effect until the contempt case
is settled. Critics have argued that judges—who
are the principal offended party—may be too
harsh. For instance, in 1994, the U.S. Supreme
Court overturned a decision by a Virginia judge
who had fined the United Mine Workers of
America $52 million in connection with vio-
lence that occurred during a 1989 strike. The
High Court stated that the fines were excessive
and improperly imposed because the union had
never had a chance to defend itself in a trial
before the fines were imposed.

Similarly, individuals who have refused to
provide courts with information have been held
in jail—sometimes for years—under contempt
charges. In Maryland, a woman involved in a
custody battle with her ex-husband refused to
reveal the whereabouts of her child. Elizabeth
Morgan spent 25 months in jail before her ex-
husband dropped the custody case and it was
revealed that the child was staying with Mor-
gan’s parents in New Zealand. Journalist Myron
Farber, of the New York Times, spent more than
three years in jail for refusing to turn over notes
that prosecutors sought for a murder trial.

Judges and scholars have defended the prac-
tices of indefinite jail time because the contem-
nor “carries the keys to his prison in his own
pocket” and can be released by complying with
the court (In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448 [8th Cir.
1902]).

Civil contempt proceedings end when the
suit from which they arose is resolved. Criminal
contempt continues as a separate matter. Settle-
ments may involve jail time, fines, or other retri-
bution. For instance, when the Cable News
Network (CNN) was found guilty of contempt
of court for airing audiotapes related to the trial
of Manuel Noriega, the deposed president of
Panama, the network was given the choice of
airing a retraction and an apology for using the
tapes or paying a large fine. The network made the apology.

Contempt of Congress

The Constitution does not explicitly grant
Congress the power to coerce cooperation from
individuals or to punish acts of disobedience or
disrespect through contempt proceedings. However, the power was discussed at the Constitutional

Convention and was implied in the
Constitution. In 1795,Congress used the power of
contempt for the first time when it arrested, tried, and punished a man accused of bribing members of the House of Representatives. Then Congress acted on its own authority—subsequently called the SELF-HELP power, which grants Congress the right to compel testimony and punish disobedience
without the involvement of a court or other
government body if the individual’s actions
obstruct the legislative process. By 1821, the
Supreme Court recognized Congress’s power to
arrest and punish individuals for contempt. In
1857, Congress created a statute governing prosecution
for contempt, which shifted the responsibility
for determining contempt from Congress
itself to the courts. Until 1945, Congress largely
ignored this criminal statute and continued to
compel testimony and deal with contemnors
through its own power.

In the late twentieth century, the Supreme
Court noted,“Congress has practically abandoned
its original practice of utilizing the coercive (selfhelp)
sanction of contempt proceedings at the bar
of the House” (Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178, 77 S. Ct. 1173, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1273[1957]).Under
the criminal statute, Congress must petition the
U.S. attorney to bring a case of possible contempt
before a GRAND JURY. The case is then tried in
federal court.

Most contempt citations arise from Congress’s
investigatory powers. In its decisions
since WORLD WAR II, the Supreme Court has
outlined requirements that Congress must meet
before it can compel testimony. The investigation
must have a valid legislative purpose. It
must be conducted by a committee or subcommittee
of the House of Representatives or Senate,
or the authority of the investigating body
must be clearly defined in a resolution. The
questions asked of witnesses must be pertinent
to the subject of inquiry. Contempt proceedings
cannot be used to harass an individual or organization.
Finally, before individuals can be held in
contempt, they must willfully default, either by
failing to appear before the investigating body or
by refusing to answer pertinent questions.
Congress’s contempt power has come into
conflict with the FIRST AMENDMENT in several
cases. The first of these cases was Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 79 S. Ct. 1081, 3 L.
Ed. 2d 1115 (1959), in which Lloyd Barenblatt
refused to answer five questions of the House
Un-American Activities Committee, regarding
Communist infiltration of educational institutions.
Barenblatt was convicted of contempt
then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing
that the questions violated his First Amendment
right to FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. The Court,
in a 5–4 decision, supported Barenblatt. The
Court stated that the questions were too vague
to support a contempt citation and that Congress’s
investigative powers must be balanced
against First Amendment rights.

The conflict between Congress’s investigative
powers and the First Amendment surfaced
again in 1992 when Nina Totenberg, a National
Public Radio correspondent, refused to answer
questions of a Senate special counsel about how
she obtained confidential documents related to the nomination of CLARENCE THOMAS to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Totenberg had earlier
revealed that the SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
was looking into accusations that Thomas had
sexually harassed members of his staff. The
charges led to public testimony by law professor
ANITA HILL. A Senate special counsel asked to
have Totenberg held in contempt when she
refused to reveal who leaked information about
the charges to her. The request was denied by the
Senate Rules Committee because of its potential
“chilling effect on the media.”
Congress also has used the contempt power
in conflicts with private parties and the EXECUTIVE
BRANCH of government. For instance,
business partners of Ferdinand Marcos, former
president of the Philippines, produced documents
for the House Foreign Affairs Committee
only under threat of contempt citations. And
James G. Watt, former secretary of the interior,
was charged with contempt by a congressional
committee in the early 1980s when, citing EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE, he refused to release INTERIOR
DEPARTMENT documents.
Contempt Proceedings against
President Clinton
On April 12, 1999, President WILLIAM JEFFERSON
CLINTON became the first sitting president
in United States history to be held in
contempt of court. The contempt charge against
President Clinton stemmed from a deposition
he gave in connection with a 1994 SEXUAL
HARASSMENT lawsuit filed by Paula Jones. Jones
v. Clinton, 858 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
Jones alleged that on May 8, 1991, she was an
Arkansas state employee working at a conference
held at a hotel in Little Rock. At some point
during the conference, Jones claimed she was
escorted to a hotel room by one of Clinton’s
bodyguards, where she was introduced to the
then-governor. Shortly after the introduction,
Jones alleged that Clinton dropped his trousers
and demanded oral sex from her. Jones said that
though she refused and was allowed to leave, her
career as a state government employee suffered
thereafter.
The Jones lawsuit languished in pre-trial discovery
for the first three years after it was filed.
On January 17, 1998, Jones and her lawyers
deposed Clinton, who was now serving his second
term as president of the United States. During
the deposition, Clinton was asked a series of
questions about his relationship with a White
House intern named Monica Lewinsky. The
president testified that he was never alone with
the former White House intern and did not have
a sexual relationship with her.
A subsequent probe by independent counsel
KENNETH STARR revealed that the president’s
DNA had been found on Lewinsky’s dress,
which eventually led Clinton to admit that he
had an “inappropriate intimate relationship”
with his former intern (Jones v. Clinton, 36 F.
Supp. 2d 1118 (E.D.Ark. 1999). The discovery of
the dress also fueled the House of Representatives
to draft ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT
against the president.
A month after giving the deposition, Clinton
filed a motion to dismiss the Jones lawsuit. On
April 1, 1998,United States District Judge SUSAN
WEBBER WRIGHT granted the motion to dismiss,
finding that Jones had “failed to demonstrate
that she has a case worthy of submitting to a
jury.” Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D.Ark.
1998). While the case was pending on appeal,
Clinton and Jones settled the sexual harassment
lawsuit for $850,000.
A year later Judge Wright addressed the issue
whether President Clinton should be held in
contempt for denying his relationship with
Lewinsky during the January 1998 deposition.
At the time he gave the deposition, there was
very little evidence indicating that the president’s
testimony was false. But in the 14 months
that followed, it became clear that the president
had not only been alone with Monica Lewinsky
but also had some form of sexual relations with
her.

Accordingly, Judge Wright found the president
in contempt for giving “false, misleading
and evasive answers that were designed to
obstruct the judicial process” at a deposition
over which she personally presided. Jones v.
Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
Although Clinton maintained that his “intimate”
relationship with Lewinsky did not constitute
“sexual” relations, Wright said that it is
difficult to construe “the president’s sworn statements
. . . as anything other than a willful refusal
to obey this court’s discovery orders.” Jones v.
Clinton 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
In July 1998, Wright leveled a $90,686 fine
against the president.Wright said regarding this
case that the fine was intended to both punish
Clinton for the contempt violation and also “to
deter others who might consider emulating the
president’s misconduct.”

Wright then referred the matter to the
Arkansas Supreme Court to determine whether
the president should lose his license to practice
law in that state. In May 1999 the Arkansas
Supreme Court Committee on Professional
Conduct recommended that Clinton be disbarred.
However, on January 19, 2001, his last
day in office, President Clinton resolved the case
before the state ethics committee by agreeing to
surrender his law license for a period of five
years and admitting, according to Pete Yost in an
AP Online report, that he “knowingly gave evasive
and misleading answers” about his relationship
with Monica Lewinsky in violation of
Arkansas rules governing attorney ethics. Additionally,
Clinton agreed to pay a $25,000 fine.

FURTHER READINGS
Alderman, Ellen, and Caroline Kennedy. 1991. In Our
Defense: The Bill of Rights in Action. New York:Morrow.
Beck, Carl. 1959. Contempt of Congress: A Study of the Prosecutions
Initiated by the Committee on Un-American
Activities, 1945–1957. Hauser Press.
Dudley, Earl C. 1993. “Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal
Distinction: A New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect
Contempts.” Virginia Law Review 79.
Goldfarb, Ronald L. 1963. The Contempt Power. New York:
Columbia Univ. Press.
Mangan, James J. 1994. “Contempt for the Fourth Estate: No
Reporter’s Privilege Before a Congressional Investigation.”
Georgetown Law Journal 83.
Yost, Pete. January 20, 2001. “Clinton Admits False Statements.”
AP Online.

CROSS-REFERENCES
Communism; Freedom of the Press.