CONSPIRACY

CONSPIRACY

An agreement between two or more persons to
engage jointly in an unlawful or criminal act, or
an act that is innocent in itself but becomes
unlawful when done by the combination of actors.
Conspiracy is governed by statute in federal
courts and most state courts. Before its CODIFI-
CATION in state and federal statutes, the crime of
conspiracy was simply an agreement to engage
in an unlawful act with the intent to carry out
the act. Federal statutes, and many state statutes,
now require not only agreement and intent but
also the commission of an OVERT ACT in fur-
therance of the agreement.

Conspiracy is a crime separate from the
criminal act for which it is developed. For exam-
ple, one who conspires with another to commit
BURGLARY and in fact commits the burglary can
be charged with both conspiracy to commit bur-
glary and burglary.

Conspiracy is an inchoate, or preparatory,
crime. It is similar to solicitation in that both
crimes are committed by manifesting an intent
to engage in a criminal act. It differs from solic-
itation in that conspiracy requires an agreement
between two or more persons, whereas solicita-
tion can be committed by one person alone.
Conspiracy also resembles attempt. How-
ever, attempt, like solicitation, can be committed
by a single person. On another level, conspiracy
requires less than attempt. A conspiracy may
exist before a crime is actually attempted,
whereas no attempt charge will succeed unless
the requisite attempt is made.

The law seeks to punish conspiracy as a sub-
stantive crime separate from the intended crime
because when two or more persons agree to
commit a crime, the potential for criminal activ-
ity increases, and as a result, the danger to the
public increases. Therefore, the very act of an
agreement with criminal intent (along with an
overt act, where required) is considered suffi-
ciently dangerous to warrant charging conspir-
acy as an offense separate from the intended
crime.

According to some criminal-law experts, the
concept of conspiracy is too elastic, and the alle-
gation of conspiracy is used by prosecutors as a
superfluous criminal charge. Many criminal
defense lawyers maintain that conspiracy is
often expanded beyond reasonable interpreta-
tions. In any case, prosecutors and criminal
defense attorneys alike agree that conspiracy
cases are usually amorphous and complex.

The Elements of Conspiracy Agreement
The essence of conspiracy is the agreement
between two or more persons. A single person acting alone cannot be guilty of conspiracy. However, if a coconspirator dies prior to the
indictment or trial, the surviving coconspirator
may still be charged with conspiracy. A HUSBAND
AND WIFE can be guilty of conspiracy. A
corporation is considered a person for conspiracy
purposes, so a corporation can be guilty of
conspiracy, but it cannot conspire with itself. For
example, if two or more employees within a corporation
conspire to break the law and subsequently
commit an act in furtherance of the
conspiracy, the corporation itself is not criminally
liable for conspiracy.

The agreement must be made voluntarily
and with an intent to participate in furthering a
common purpose.Mere knowledge or approval,
in the absence of an actual agreement to cooperate,
does not constitute conspiracy.
Once an agreement with criminal intent is
made, the conspiracy is complete, unless the
applicable statute requires the additional element
of an overt act. The agreement need not be
written or formal, and it may be proved by CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE. A tacit understanding
is sufficient to constitute agreement, even if no
words are spoken that expressly communicate
the conspiracy. Conspiracy exists if there is some
form of mutual understanding between persons
working together with a common unlawful end.
Intent Criminal intent is also necessary to
create a conspiracy. This means that the parties
must intend both to agree on and to engage in
the unlawful act. Ignorance of the law is not
usually a defense to a crime, but an unwitting
conspirator may defend against conspiracy
charges on grounds of ignorance. Ignorance will
not be a defense if the person continues to participate
in the common plan after learning of its
illegality.
Either the purpose of the agreement or the
means by which it is accomplished must be illegal
to support criminal prosecution on conspiracy
charges. If the purpose is unlawful, the
offense is committed even if the means used to
achieve the purpose are lawful. One illustration
is where a noncustodial parent conspires with
another person to KIDNAP the parent’s child,
and the child is abducted during a courtapproved
visit. Conspiracy also occurs if the
purpose of the agreement is lawful but the
means used to achieve it are illegal. For example,
if a custodial parent chooses to retrieve a child
who has been kidnapped by the noncustodial
parent, an agreement to use unlawful force constitutes
conspiracy.
Overt Act An overt act can be any step that
indicates that the execution of the conspiracy
has begun. This can be an innocuous act and
need not be illegal unto itself. For example, if
two persons agree to rob a bank, then purchase
a ski mask, the act of buying the mask may constitute
the overt act required to charge the two
with conspiracy.
The overt act must follow the agreement and
must be executed with an intent to carry out the
purpose of the conspiracy. For example, if one of
the potential bank robbers buys a ski mask after
the agreement is made, the purchase may not
constitute the overt act if the ski mask will not
be worn to carry out the ROBBERY. An overt act
need not be committed by each and every conspirator;
an overt act by one conspirator solidifies
the offense for all coconspirators. Thus, a
conspirator who does not participate in the
overt act can be charged with conspiracy.
If a conspirator completely and voluntarily
renounces the criminal purpose to all conspirators,
that person may withdraw from the conspiracy
before the overt act is committed. Many
jurisdictions require that the withdrawing conspirator
also inform law enforcement officials or
take measures to thwart the crime, in order to
avoid criminal liability for the conspiracy.
Other Considerations
A conspiracy exists as long as measures are
taken to conceal evidence of the crime. A person
who did not participate in the original agreement
can become a coconspirator after the
actual criminal act if the person joins in the concealment
of the conspiracy. Whether a coconspirator
received personal benefit or profit is of
no importance.
Generally, conspirators are liable for all
crimes committed within the course or scope of
the conspiracy. The application of this general
rule varies from state to state. Ordinarily, an act
is within the course or scope of the conspiracy if
it is a foreseeable result of the agreement. In
some states, a conspirator is not liable where he
or she has no knowledge of the specific act and
argues successfully that the act was beyond the
scope of the conspiracy. Also, if the purpose of
the agreement is later changed by coconspirators,
a conspirator who did not participate in the
alteration may not be held liable for the new
conspiracy. A person is liable for conspiracy only
in regard to the meaning of the agreement as he
or she understands it.
In some jurisdictions, a person may be guilty
of conspiracy even if a coconspirator is immune
from prosecution. For example, if two persons
conspire to commit murder and one is found to
have been insane at the time of the killing, the
other conspirator may not be exempt from prosecution
for conspiracy.
One who provides services to conspirators
will not be guilty of conspiracy if that person has
not participated in the agreement and does not
know that a conspiracy exists. There must be a
willful participation in the conspiracy, as well as an intent to further the common purpose or
design for conspiratorial liability. Therefore, aiding
a conspiracy by selling material to further it
does not make someone a conspirator if the person
does not know of the conspiracy, even if that
person knows the goods sold will be used for an
unlawful purpose. However, if the circumstances
indicate a conspiracy, one who cooperates
and knowingly sells goods for illegal use
may be guilty of conspiracy.
Generally, if a number of conspirators agree
to carry out different functions in furtherance of
the conspiracy, the agreement constitutes a single
conspiracy. This is so even if the different
functions amount to more than one unlawful
purpose. In some states, however, the different
functions may constitute multiple conspiracies
if there is an agreement to commit more than
one crime.
Punishment for the crime of conspiracy is
ordinarily defined by statute and varies in accordance
with the conspiracy’s objective. For example,
a conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor will
not be subject to the same punishment as a conspiracy
to commit a felony. Conspiracy may be
alleged in a civil case if the plaintiff has suffered
an injury as a result of the conspiracy. Civil conspiracy
is ordinarily not a CAUSE OF ACTION, but
the existence of a conspiracy may be used in
determining the amount of damages in a civil
action and the respective liabilities of civil codefendants
for the payment of damages.
History of Conspiracy
Federal conspiracy statutes were first passed
in 1909. Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 371, it is a crime to
commit an offense against or to defraud the
United States or any agency of the United States.
If the crime actually committed is a felony, the
punishment is a fine of not more than $10,000
or five years’ imprisonment, or both. Under 18
U.S.C.A. § 372, it is a crime to conspire to
impede or injure a federal law enforcement officer.
The U.S. Congress has made specific conspiracies
illegal through a variety of statutes. For
example, conspiracy to murder federal or foreign
officials is prohibited by 18 U.S.C.A. § 1117,
a freestanding statute. Conspiracy to kidnap is
contained in subsection C of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201,
the federal kidnapping statute. Other federal
statutes prohibit conspiracies to assassinate the
president, the vice president, and their successors;
assassinate the director or deputy director
of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA);
assassinate or kidnap a Supreme Court justice;
interfere with commerce and trade; violate computer
laws; launder money; obstruct state or
local regulation of gambling; injure property of
the federal government; tamper with consumer
products; gather, transmit, lose, remove, or
destroy national defense information or materials;
incite sailors to mutiny; engage in prohibited
practices regarding radio broadcasts or game
show contests; defraud the TENNESSEE VALLEY
AUTHORITY; violate or interfere with VOTING
RIGHTS; and sexually exploit children.
Conspiracy cases are often infamous for
their ambition and breadth. The assassination of
President ABRAHAM LINCOLN in 1865 by John
Wilkes Booth was a product of a conspiracy
between Booth and several supporters of the
defunct Confederacy. In the early 1950s, the U.S.
Congress conducted numerous hearings on
Communist conspiracies against the United
States. In the mid-1970s, several White House
aides were indicted on charges of conspiracy in
connection with the 1972 burglary of the offices
of the Democratic National Committee in the
Watergate Hotel, in Washington, D.C.
In November 1986, a Lebanese weekly, Al-
Shiraa, reported that the U.S. government had
secretly sold military weapons to so-called moderate
factions in Iran. In exchange for the arms
sales, according to Al-Shiraa, the moderate Iranians
would work to secure the release of U.S.
citizens held hostage in Lebanon. Thus began an
investigation into a conspiracy that became popularly
known as the IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR.
Congressional investigations that followed
the Al-Shiraa article revealed a covert “enterprise”
connected with the arms sales. The operation,
staffed by private citizens and funded by
private monies, had diverted profits from the
sale of the weapons to the Contras, a loosely knit
military force in Honduras that sought to overthrow
the socialist Sandinista government in
Nicaragua.
Congressional investigations in the spring of
1987 revealed that the enterprise had been
supervised by U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
(NSC) staff. The NSC, created by the
National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 496 [50
U.S.C.A. §§ 402]) and amended by the National
Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579
[50 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.]), existed to advise the
president with respect to the INTEGRATION of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating
to national security.
One of the many problems presented by the
enterprise was its apparent violation of the
Boland amendments to a series of appropriations
bills. These bills were established in the
early 1980s to prevent any “agency or entity of
the United States involved in intelligence activities”
from spending funds available to it “to support
military or paramilitary operations in
Nicaragua” (133 Cong. Rec. H4982-87 [daily ed.
June 15, 1987]). The covert arms sales also violated
procedural and substantive requirements
of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Pub. L.
No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320 [22 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2751–2796c (1989 Supp.)]). Moreover, the
executive branch’s failure to notify Congress of
the covert arms sales flouted the reporting provisions
of the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act
(Pub. L. No. 96-450, tit. IV, § 407(b)(1), 94 Stat.
1981 [50 U.S.C.A. § 413 (1982)]).
In 1987, Lawrence Walsh, a former AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION president and former
federal judge, was assigned by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
Independent Counsel Division, to investigate
the Contra-funding scheme. In March 1988,
Walsh charged Richard Secord, Albert Hakim,
Oliver North, and John Poindexter with conspiracy
to obstruct the U.S. government. North
and Poindexter had worked for the NSC.
As in all conspiracy cases, an important goal
of the prosecution was to determine who was
involved in the agreement. A major issue in the
Iran-Contra investigation was to determine precisely
who in the EXECUTIVE BRANCH authorized
or was aware of the arms diversions and,
specifically, whether the president had knowledge
of the unlawful activities.
In the legal battles that ensued over access to
information in connection with the prosecutions,
Walsh faced challenges by the RONALD
REAGAN and GEORGE H. W. BUSH administrations,
the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, intelligence
agencies, and lawyers for the accused. Ultimately,
the White House refused to relinquish
classified information crucial to the prosecutions,
and Walsh was forced to drop all conspiracy
charges. The Iran-Contra Affair resulted in
criminal convictions of several persons directly
connected with the Reagan administration, but
Walsh was never able to link the president to a
conspiracy to obstruct the U.S. government.
In another conspiracy case, Patricia Caldwell,
a bookkeeper with the Northwest Community
Exchange (NCE), was charged with
conspiracy to defraud the United States because
she refused to provide to the IRS certain account
information it requested regarding NCE customers.
The NCE was one of a number of warehouse
banks, which promised their customers
that they would not reveal account information
to third parties, including the INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE (IRS). As a result, the IRS shut
down the warehouse banks, and it charged several
customers and employees with conspiracy
to defraud the United States. A jury convicted
Caldwell of conspiring to defraud the United
States, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 371.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
Caldwell’s conspiracy conviction (United States
v. Caldwell, 989 F.2d 1056 [1993]). The government
had argued that people have a duty to
conduct their business affairs so as to not impair
or impede the collection of revenue by the IRS.
The majority opinion, written by Judge Alex
Kozinski, rejected this interpretation of 18
U.S.C.A. § 371 and held that to defraud the government,
a person had to act deceitfully or dishonestly.
To allow otherwise would create an
oppressive theory of criminal conspiracy. The
court observed that under the government’s theory,
“a husband who asks his wife to buy him a
radar detector would be a felon . . . because their
actions would obstruct the government function
of catching speeders.” According to the
court, Congress did not intend to make a federal
crime out of actions that merely make “the government’s
job more difficult.”
The jury in Caldwell’s case had not been
instructed that it had to find that Caldwell
agreed to obstruct the IRS’s tax-collecting functions
by deceitful or dishonest means. This failure
to inform the jury about an essential
element of conspiracy constituted reversible
error, and Caldwell’s conviction was overturned.
American Honda Conspiracy
The sheer size of a conspiracy can create distinct
problems for prosecutors and defense
attorneys alike. In 1993, U.S. attorneys in New
Hampshire began to investigate employees of
the American Honda Motor Company. By 1994,
prosecutors had cobbled together an immense
conspiracy-based commercial BRIBERY case.
The conspiracy prosecutions of American
Honda executives and dealers began to develop in 1989, when Richard Nault, an automobile
dealer in Nashua, New Hampshire, brought a
civil suit against American Honda, claiming
unfair treatment. In 1993, after testimony raised
concerns of bribery, the judge in Nault’s case
recommended that federal authorities investigate
the financial affairs at American Honda.
Investigations by the FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (FBI) revealed a widespread
pattern of illegal payoffs in which American
Honda executives were given cash, jewelry, cars,
and store ownership interests in return for the
awarding of new Honda dealerships and favorable
car allocations. According to the prosecutors,
assistant U.S. attorneys Michael Connolly
and Donald Feith, the alleged conspiracy involved
twenty-two American Honda executives and
dealers, encompassed thirty states, and was
responsible for the misappropriation of approximately
$50 million. In 1993 and 1994, prosecutors
dangled various substantive and conspiracy
charges before the executives and dealers.
By the end of 1994, only three of the alleged
conspirators had refused to plead guilty: John
Billmyer, an 18-year American Honda veteran
and longtime vice president of auto field sales;
Stanley Cardiges, another vice president of auto
field sales and Billmyer’s protégé; and Dennis
Josleyn, whose last position was West Coast sales
manager for Acura, American Honda’s flagship
automobile. In March 1994, Billmyer, Cardiges,
and Josleyn were arrested at their homes,
booked at local jails, and then released pending
trial.
A federal GRAND JURY charged Billmyer with
one count of conspiring with Cardiges and
Josleyn to defraud American Honda, the United
States, the TREASURY DEPARTMENT, and the IRS,
in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341. Specifically,
the indictment alleged that Billmyer, Josleyn,
and Cardiges had conspired to receive money
and gifts by secretly selling the valuable contract
rights conferred on prospective dealers by
American Honda.
Cardiges and Josleyn were charged with participating
in the broad conspiracy with Billmyer
and also conspiring to receive kickbacks in connection
with an American Honda advertising
campaign. Cardiges and Josleyn were further
charged with violating the RACKETEER INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT (18
U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.). In November 1993,
Cardiges allegedly asked former American
Honda zone manager Edward Temple to tell the
FBI that payments the two had received from a
hidden interest in a Conway, Arkansas, car dealership
were actually loan payments.
American Honda was portrayed by prosecutors
as a victim of the conspiracies. As the trial
approached, lawyers for Cardiges and Josleyn
prepared a defense that would further victimize
the company. According to Cardiges’s lawyer
Philip Israels, any conspiracy case should have
included the Japanese executives of Honda
Motor Company International, the owner of
American Honda. Israels maintained that the
Japanese executives knew of, condoned, and
even participated in the kickback schemes.
Israels further charged that the federal government
had information that suggested that
Japanese executives knew of the kickbacks, and
that the decision not to prosecute the Japanese
executives was being used as a bargaining chip in
trade negotiations between the United States
and Japan.
Josleyn adopted a defense similar to that of
Cardiges. Josleyn’s attorneys, Paul Twomey and
Mark Sisti, noted that the alleged conspiracy was
so widespread that Japanese executives must
have known of it. Josleyn would deny no specific
facts. Rather, he would invert the meaning of the
mountain of evidence uncovered by the prosecutors
and the FBI, to show that the Japanese
executives must have known about and
approved of the kickback schemes. Such a showing
would allow Josleyn’s attorneys to argue that
the alleged conspiracy was actually a lawful, routine
business practice promoted by American
Honda’s parent company.
Billmyer had retired from American Honda
in 1988. His lawyers, David Long and Kevin
Sharkey, centered his defense on a variety of
grounds. Their arguments included that the
prosecution of Billmyer was barred by the fiveyear
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS on conspiracy
charges because the indictment actually alleged
multiple conspiracies, and any criminal liability
for a conspiracy involving Billmyer expired in
1993; Billmyer had withdrawn from any alleged
conspiracies by retiring in 1988; and New
Hampshire was an improper venue because
none of the acts Billmyer was alleged to have
committed had any relation to New Hampshire.
In the months before trial, several motions
to dismiss the case were denied by Judge Joseph
DiClerico of the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Hampshire. On January 22, 1994,
after two years of maintaining his innocence and just one day before jury selection was scheduled
to begin, Cardiges pleaded guilty to all charges.
In exchange for lenient sentencing recommendations
by the prosecutors, Cardiges agreed to
testify against Billmyer and Josleyn. All the conspirators
except Billmyer and Josleyn were prepared
to testify to conspiracies to defraud.
The case proceeded to jury trial in February
1995 and was presided over by Judge DiClerico.
In opening statements, assistant U.S. attorney
Connolly submitted to the jury that the conspiracy
was limited to a few rogue U.S. executives
and dealers, and that the United States and
American Honda had been conspired against
and defrauded by them. Twomey declared that
“the government is going to take you everywhere—
north, south, east and west” to prove a
conspiracy that was supposedly limited to U.S.
executives and was completely unknown to
Japanese executives. Long and Sharkey covered
the litany of apparent infirmities in the government’s
conspiracy case against Billmyer.
A seemingly endless stream of witnesses
then proceeded to testify against Billmyer and
Josleyn. American Honda executives and dealers
regaled the jury with descriptive accounts of
opulence and excess. The kickback schemes
resembled homage to the executives, a practice
that Honda and Acura dealers called kissing the
ring. Dealers and executives told of expensive
offerings, including cash payments, free automobiles,
Rolex watches, shopping sprees, swimming
pools, and tuition payments for children.
In several days on the witness stand, Cardiges
alone testified to the receipt of approximately $5
million in kickbacks.
At the close of the government’s case in
chief, Long made a motion to dismiss, arguing
that the suit was one of multiple conspiracies,
that any conspiracy involving Billmyer supported
by the evidence was barred by the statute
of limitations, and that any payments or gifts
received by Billmyer were unconnected to any
conspiracy with Josleyn. The motion was
denied, Billmyer called no witnesses, and Josleyn
began his defense.
Throughout the presentation of the government’s
case, Josleyn’s lawyers had been fighting a
battle with American Honda. They sought to
obtain, and eventually received, a copy of handwritten
notes kept by Sherry Cameron, American
Honda’s vice president of human resources.
Cameron’s notes had been made in connection
with American Honda’s 1992 internal investigations
into rumors of kickbacks. American
Honda had appealed Judge DiClerico’s decision
to order American Honda’s release of the notes
to the defense, but the First Circuit Court of
Appeals refused to reverse the order.
Cameron had testified for the government in
March 1995, and Sisti’s cross-examination of her
had been suspended while the production of her
notes was contested. On May 15, 1995, Cameron
resumed the witness stand and was faced with
poster-sized copies of her notes, one of which
revealed that her “point of view” in the investigation
was to “try to protect” the company.
Cameron further testified that she had limited
her investigation to facts, not rumors.
Twomey then called to the stand J. D. Powers,
a prominent market research specialist for the
automobile industry. Powers testified that in 1983,
he sent a letter to Yoshihida Munekujni, then
president of American Honda, informing him of
widespread rumors of corruption in American
Honda. According to Powers, several unindicted
top-ranking American Honda executives knew of
the kickback schemes in the early 1980s.
This and other evidence allowed Twomey to
argue in his closing statement that the conspiracy
was so implicit as to constitute one company’s
policy. Twomey asked the jury whether it
could be satisfied that it knew the entire truth in
the case. Long contended, in part, that the government
had been selective and heavy-handed
in its prosecution. The case was submitted to the
jury. After five days of deliberations, Billmyer
and Josleyn were convicted of all charges. Both
vowed to appeal.

Although no Japanese executives were
charged in the case, 20 American Honda executives
and dealers pleaded guilty, making this the
largest conspiracy-based commercial bribery
prosecution in the history of the United States.
United States v. Mohamed

Even before the SEPTEMBER 11TH ATTACKS
against the United States in 2001, the country
and the world were well aware of the activities of
Osama bin Laden and the terrorist network
known as al Qaeda. In October 2000, 48-yearold
Ali A. Mohamed pled guilty in federal court
in New York to five counts of conspiracy, including
conspiring to kill U.S. nationals; conspiring
to murder, kidnap, and maim outside the United
States; conspiring to murder in general; and
conspiring to destroy U.S. buildings and property.
The charges stemmed from the August 7, 1998, TERRORISM at U.S. embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya, and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. More
than 200 people, including 12 American citizens,
were killed in the attacks, and more than
5,000 were injured.

The case attracted national and international
attention because Mohamed was a former
U.S. Army officer and because he implicated bin
Laden in the bombings. Mohamed, a native
Egyptian, served briefly with the CIA in 1984,
until the agency determined that Mohamed had
revealed his assignment to Middle East terrorists.
In 1985,Mohamed moved to the California,
seeking to become a U.S. citizen. He enlisted in
the U.S. Army and was assigned to the Special
Operations Command at Fort Bragg, where the
Army trains its Special Forces. Mohamed was
trained as a paratrooper and achieved the rank
of sergeant before being honorably discharged
in 1989. Upon his discharge, he renewed his
contacts with the Egyptian “Islamic Jihad,” a
radical group he had secretly associated with
since the early 1980s. In 1991 he was recruited
by al Qaeda to serve several missions directly
related to bin Laden’s terrorist activities.
In 1993, bin Laden asked Mohamed to scout
possible sites in Kenya to target for terrorist
attacks. Mohamed, then a naturalized U.S. citizen,
took photographs and drew diagrams of the
U.S. embassy in Nairobi.He personally delivered
these to bin Laden, who planned the attack that
occurred about five years later. Mohamed
became a suspect when one of his aliases turned
up at the Nairobi bombing site. After reaching a
plea bargain agreement with federal prosecutors,
Mohamed implicated bin Laden in the
attacks. At the time, prosecutors said it was the
first time that a close associate of bin Laden had
implicated the reputed terrorist in open court.
Mohamed faces a prison term for an unspecified
number of years. Less than one year after he gave
his testimony, the United States suffered terrorist
attacks on its own soil, as al Qaeda operatives
destroyed the World Trade Center in New York
City and seriously damaged the Pentagon in
Washington, D.C.

FURTHER READINGS
Kaplan, John, and Robert Weisberg. 1991. Criminal Law:
Cases and Materials. 2d ed. Boston: Little, Brown.
Stone, Joseph, and Tim Yohn. 1992. Prime Time and Misdemeanors.
New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press.

CROSS-REFERENCES
Communism.

Quiz Show Conspiracies

In the 1950s, the new medium of television was fast
becoming a staple in U.S. households, and quiz
shows, with their low production costs and highstakes
drama, were enjoying immense popularity.
Contestants on quiz shows played until they lost;
some competed for months and won tens of thousands
of dollars. The quiz show concept of rewarding
intelligence with instant wealth appealed to the U.S.
public and inspired many to seek an invitation to play.
In May 1958, Edward Hilgemeier was in the studio
audience of the quiz show “Dotto” when he was
approached by a “Dotto” producer. The producer
asked if Hilgemeier would like to compete on the
show. Hilgemeier, an aspiring actor, accepted the
offer. On May 20, he went to the “Dotto” set as a
standby contestant.
Marie Winn, a student at Columbia University,
was the defending champion of “Dotto.” A charming,
animated native of Czechoslovakia, the twenty-oneyear-
old Winn had won “Dotto” on two consecutive
nights. As Hilgemeier waited for his possible turn
against Winn, he got the impression that studio personnel
were unduly familiar with the woman.
Winn’s first challenger that day was Yeffe Kimball
Slatin. Hilgemeier watched as Winn defeated Slatin
with ease; Winn seemed to have every answer at
hand. After the contest between Winn and Slatin,
Hilgemeier returned to the contestants’ dressing
room, where he discovered a notebook belonging to
Winn that appeared to contain answers to “Dotto”
questions. Hilgemeier notified Slatin, and the two
returned to the dressing room, where one of them tore
the apparent answer sheet out of Winn’s notebook.
That night, after speaking to Slatin’s lawyer,
Hilgemeier and Slatin went to the “Dotto” offices,
where they spoke with the show’s producers. The
“Dotto” producers promised compensation to both
Hilgemeier and Slatin. Slatin agreed to stay quiet
about the affair for a nominal sum of money from
“Dotto,” but Hilgemeier, fearing for his reputation,
refused. Hilgemeier took his information to Manhattan
district attorney Frank Hogan and assistant district
attorney Joseph Stone.
Initially, the Manhattan district attorney’s office
was skeptical of Hilgemeier’s complaint. The rigging
of quiz shows was, after all, not illegal. Shortly into
the investigation, however, it became apparent to
Hogan and Stone that a widespread conspiracy was
in place to hide the truth from the public—and conspiracy
to commit FRAUD was illegal.
The Manhattan district attorney’s office convened
GRAND JURY hearings, and a subcommittee of
the U.S. House of Representatives held congressional
hearings on the quiz shows’ practices. Many
producers and contestants lied to the grand jury and
the congressional subcommittee about their role in
quiz show trickery. On October 14, 1959, their elaborate
web of deceit began to unravel when Charles
Van Doren, a Columbia University professor, admitted
to the subcommittee his involvement in a rigged quiz
show, “Twenty-One.” (This incident was the basis of
Robert Redford’s 1995 film Quiz Show.)
Quiz show producers and contestants eventually
admitted their subterfuge to authorities. What
emerged were stories of how favored quiz show contestants
were coached to agonize and sweat over
answers they already knew. On August 30, 1960, the
U.S. Congress passed a bill that made giving or
receiving assistance on a quiz show a federal crime.
The bill was signed into law by President DWIGHT D.
EISENHOWER two weeks later. Now, under 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 509, it is a federal crime to rig quiz shows with the
intent to deceive the listening or viewing public.
Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 371, a conspiracy to engage in
prohibited practices regarding radio and television
quiz shows is also a federal crime.