AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES

AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES

The FOURTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution guarantees U.S. citizens freedom from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court established the principle that a warrant issued by a “neutral and detached magistrate” must be obtained before a government authority may breach the individual privacy that the Fourth Amendment secures. The Katz decision held that “searches that are conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.”Over the years, the Court has recognized
a number of exceptions to this rule that
allow the police to conduct a legal search without
a warrant in certain situations. One of these
exceptions is for automobile searches.
Warrantless Searches
The automobile exception was first
announced in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925), where
the Court held that federal PROHIBITION agents
had been justified in searching, without a warrant,
an automobile that they had stopped on a
public highway, because the agents had had
PROBABLE CAUSE to believe that it contained
contraband. The Court found that the search
had been justified by the exigency of the circumstances,
noting that, unlike a dwelling, store,
or other structure, an automobile can be
“quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.”
After the Carroll decision, the Court
embarked on a long, and often confusing, line of
decisions that interpreted the automobile exception
as it applied not only to automobiles but
also to containers found in automobiles; to
mobile homes; and to sobriety checkpoints. For
several decades, the Court rarely cited Carroll in
vehicle-search cases. Instead, it relied on the
“search incident to arrest” doctrine, which
allowed the police to search, without a warrant, the areas surrounding an arrest site. Originally,
the police could search areas that were outside
the control of the arrested person. (See, e.g.,
Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 [8th Cir. 1966],
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 [1967], in which the
Court let stand a ruling by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals that the search of a car parked
in a driveway, while the suspect was arrested at
the front door of his house, was valid).However,
the Court restricted the “search incident to
arrest” standard in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969),
which held that a warrantless search must be
limited to the area within the immediate control
of the arrestee.
After the Chimel decision, the Court abandoned
this line of reasoning and returned to the
“probable cause accompanied by exigent circumstances”
rationale in Carroll. In Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d
419 (1970), the justices found that Carroll supported
a warrantless search of an impounded
car. They based this finding on the theory that
had the search been conducted at the time of the
arrest, it would have been valid because of the
exigent circumstances that existed at that time.
The fact that the car was impounded, and therefore
immobile, by the time the search was conducted
did not affect the Court’s decision. A year
later, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971) (plurality
opinion), the Court held that a search conducted
with a warrant that was later found to be
invalid fell outside of the automobile exception.
The Court stated that the police in Coolidge
could not have legally conducted a warrantless
search at the arrest scene because no exigent circumstances
existed: At the time of arrest, the
arrestee had not had access to the car and therefore
could not have moved it. The Coolidge decision
firmly established that the police must show
both probable cause and exigent circumstances
in order for a warrantless search to be valid.
The Court then added an alternative rationale
to support automobile searches, with its decision
in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S. Ct.
2464, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1974) (plurality opinion).
In Cardwell, the police had made an impression
of the tires of the suspect’s car and had taken
paint samples from the car, without a warrant.
The Court held that the search had been permissible
because the police had had probable cause
and the search had been conducted in a reasonable
manner. No exigency had existed in this
case, but the Court found justification in the
principle that individuals have a “lower expectation
of privacy” in their automobiles.Writing for
the plurality, Justice HARRY A. BLACKMUN stated,
“One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a
motor vehicle because its function is transportation
and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as
the repository of personal effects.”
The same rationale supported the Court’s
determination that police officers do not violate
the Fourth Amendment when they search a passenger’s
personal belongings inside an automobile
that they have probable cause to believe
contains contraband. Officers with probable
cause to search a car may inspect passengers’
belongings that are capable of concealing the object of the search. If probable cause justifies
the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, including
every part of the vehicle and its contents that
may conceal the object of the search, then this
rule extends to passengers’ property as well, the
Supreme Court wrote in Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408
(U.S. 1999). The BALANCING of the relative
interests weighs in favor of allowing searches of
a passenger’s belongings, because passengers, no
less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation
of privacy with regard to the property that they
transport in cars.
This “lesser expectation of privacy” rationale
was not sufficient to support a warrantless
search in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977). In Chadwick,
the defendants were arrested immediately
after they had placed a footlocker in their trunk.
Federal agents, who had probable cause to
believe that the footlocker contained marijuana,
impounded the car and opened the footlocker
without a warrant. The Court found that
although the agents did have probable cause to
search the footlocker, they had not proved that
they had probable cause to search the car in
order to find the footlocker. Since the car was
impounded, no exigent circumstances existed.
Furthermore, the Court held that the defendants
had a greater expectation of privacy in the
closed footlocker than in an automobile, which
is open to public view. “The factors which
diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile
do not apply to the (defendants’) footlocker,” the
Court concluded. Therefore, the “lesser expectation
of privacy” rationale did not support an
extension of the automobile exception to the
closed footlocker.
Armed with the Carroll-Chambers line of
cases (the “probable cause accompanied by
exigent circumstances” rationale) and the Chadwick
decision (the “lower expectation of privacy”
rationale), the Court tackled the question
of whether a warrantless search of a suitcase
found in the trunk of a taxi fell under either justification.
In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979), the police
had probable cause to believe that a suitcase
picked up by the defendant at an airport contained
contraband. After the defendant placed
the suitcase in the trunk of a taxi and left the airport,
the police stopped the taxi, opened the
trunk, and searched the suitcase, which contained
the contraband that they expected to
find. The Court evaluated the facts under each
rationale and found that (a) once the taxi had
been stopped, no exigency existed; and, (b) an
individual’s privacy expectations in a suitcase,
which “serve[s] as a repository for personal
items,” are greater than his or her privacy expectations
in an automobile. For these reasons, the
Court held that the search had violated the
Fourth Amendment.
Later cases, however, extended the automobile
exception to containers located in an automobile,
where authorities have probable cause
to search the automobile. For example, in United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L.
Ed. 2d 572 (1982), the police stopped a car that
they had probable cause to believe contained
contraband. Without a warrant, they opened a
closed paper bag that they found inside the car’s
trunk, and discovered heroin. The Court held
that the search was valid, reasoning that if the
police had probable cause to conduct a warrantless
search of the vehicle, they also had justification
to search the bag.
However, the Court retreated from this
holding in Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119
S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (U.S. 1998), where it
held that a Fourth Amendment violation had
occurred when a police officer had conducted a
full search of a car, including the trunk, after the
driver had been stopped for speeding. The officer
had issued the driver a citation, rather than
arresting him, although Iowa law would have
permitted an arrest. The U.S. Supreme Court
held that the search could not be sustained
under the “search incident to arrest” exception
to the warrant requirement, as the underlying
rationales for the exception, including the need
to disarm the suspect and to preserve evidence,
did not justify the search of the car’s trunk.
While the concern for officer safety in the context
of a routine traffic stop might justify the
minimal additional intrusion of ordering a
driver and passengers out of the car, the Court
said, it does not, by itself, justify the often considerably
greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype
search.
The automobile exception was also extended
to searches of some mobile homes, in California
v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed.
2d 406 (1985). In Carney, the police had searched
a motor home that was parked in a public lot.
The Court found the search to be valid, stating
that the mobile home was being used for transportation
and that it therefore was as readily movable as an automobile. In addition, the
Court noted a reduced expectation of privacy in
a mobile home, as contrasted with an ordinary
residence, as mobile homes, like cars, are regulated
by the state. In this case, where the mobile
home was parked in a public parking lot, rather
than a mobile home park, and was not anchored
in any way, it resembled a vehicle more than a
residence. Therefore, the automobile exception
applied. Carney established not only that the
automobile exception applies to some mobile
homes but also that it applies to parked vehicles.
Another extension of the automobile exception,
called the inventory exception, was recognized
by the Court in South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed.
2d 1000 (1976). Donald Opperman’s illegally
parked vehicle was ticketed and towed to an
impound lot, where the police inventoried its
contents. In an unlocked glove compartment,
they found marijuana. The Court held that once
a vehicle has been legally impounded, its contents
may be inventoried. Three justifications
were given: protection of the owner’s property
while it is in police custody; protection of the
police against claims; and protection of the
police against danger. Likewise, in Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d
739 (1987), the Court found that marijuana discovered
in a closed backpack during an inventory
of an impounded vehicle had been legally
seized because there was no showing that “the
police, who had followed standardized procedures,
had acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose
of investigation.”The Court concluded that
“reasonable police regulations relating to inventory
procedures administered in GOOD FAITH
satisfy the Fourth Amendment.”
This patchwork of decisions led many,
including Justice LEWIS F. POWELL JR., to conclude
that “the law of SEARCH AND SEIZURE with
respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing”
(Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 101 S. Ct.
2841, 69 L. Ed. 2d 744 [1981] [Powell, J., concurring]).
The Court attempted to put the confusion
to rest with its decision in California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed.
2d 619 (1991). In Acevedo, federal drug agents
tracked a bag that they knew contained marijuana,
as it was in transit to the defendant. They
then notified police officers, who watched as the
defendant put the bag into the trunk of a car and
drove away. The police officers stopped the car,
opened the trunk, and searched the bag, finding
the marijuana. The Court held that the search
was legal, stating that it is not necessary for an
officer to obtain a warrant before searching a
container located in an automobile when the
officer has probable cause to believe that the
container holds contraband or evidence. After
analyzing the long and ambiguous line of automobile
exception cases, the Court decided that
the distinction between the Ross situation
(where the police had probable cause to search
the car) and the Sanders situation (where the
police had probable cause only to search the
container) was not supported by the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment. Discarding
the reasoning in Sanders as unworkable and an
unjustified impingement on legitimate police
activity, the justices announced a new and
unequivocal rule: “The police may search an
automobile and the containers within it where
they have probable cause to believe contraband
or evidence is contained.”
The Acevedo decision was met with harsh
criticism by some legal analysts, who saw it as an
excessive retreat from Fourth Amendment guarantees.
Supporters, however, pointed out that the
police still must establish that they have probable
cause to conduct a warrantless search before
such a search will be found valid. Probable cause
can be shown in a variety of ways, but generally
it follows from a chain of events that raise police
suspicions from the level of mere conjecture to
the level of reasonable grounds. For example, in
Acevedo, federal drug enforcement agents had
previously seized and inspected the package that
was eventually delivered to the defendant, and
they knew that it contained marijuana. In
Sanders, a reliable informant had told the police
that the defendant would arrive at the airport
carrying a green suitcase containing marijuana.
And in Ross, an informant had told the police
that someone known as Bandit was selling drugs
from the trunk of his car; when the police located
the car described by the informant, they discovered
through a computer check that the driver,
the defendant, Albert Ross Jr., used the alias Bandit.
From these cases, the Court has shown that
ARBITRARY searches or searches based on mere
suspicion will not be supported by a spurious
claim of probable cause.
Warrantless Seizures of Automobile as
Forfeitable Contraband
The Fourth Amendment does not require
the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have
probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable
contraband. The U.S. Supreme Court thus
reversed a decision in which the Supreme Court
of Florida had held that the warrantless seizure
of an automobile, pursuant to the Florida Contraband
Forfeiture Act, violated the Fourth
Amendment in the absence of exigent circumstances.
Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 119 S. Ct.
1555, 143 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1999).
The case involved a defendant who had been
convicted of possession of cocaine, which had
been found during a police inventory search of
his automobile following its warrantless seizure
from a public parking lot pursuant to the
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. Fla. Stat.
932.701. Although the police lacked probable
cause to believe that the defendant’s car contained
contraband, they did have probable cause
to believe that the vehicle itself was contraband
under the Florida law.
Fourth Amendment JURISPRUDENCE recognizes
the need to seize readily movable contraband
before it is spirited away, and this need is
equally weighty when the automobile, as distinguished
from its contents, is the very contraband
that the police seek to secure, the Court
observed. In addition to the special considerations
recognized in the context of movable
items, the Court continued, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has consistently afforded law
enforcement officials greater latitude in exercising
their duties in public places. Because the
police had seized defendant’s vehicle from a
public area, the Court concluded that the warrantless
seizure had not involved any invasion of
the defendant’s privacy.
Sobriety Checkpoints
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Court dealt
with a new line of cases in which the automobile
exception has been used to justify sobrietycheckpoint
programs. Under such programs,
police stop motorists, typically along an interstate
highway, for the purpose of apprehending
drivers who are impaired by alcohol. One such
program was challenged and found to be constitutional
in Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d
412 (1990). The Court applied a somewhat more
stringent test than that used in automobile
search cases, citing as relevant authority a line of
cases involving highway checkpoints for discovering
illegal ALIENS (see, e.g., United States v.
Martinez, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed.
2d 1116 [1976]; Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.
Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 [1979]). Brown required “a weighing of the gravity of the public
concerns served by the seizure, the degree to
which the seizure advances the public interest,
and the severity of the interference with individual
liberty.” Applying that balancing test, the
majority in Sitz found that the intrusion on individual
liberty imposed by Michigan’s sobriety
checkpoint program was outweighed by the
advancement of the state’s interest in preventing
drunk driving. Therefore, it concluded that the
program did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Similar sobriety-checkpoint programs have
been used in other states. Since the Sitz decision,
all have passed constitutional muster. Less certain
is the constitutionality of narcotics checkpoints.
In 1992, Minnesota instituted a random
narcotics checkpoint on an interstate highway’s
exit ramp. The police stopped every third or
fourth car and asked several questions of the
occupants. If the answers or demeanor of the
occupants aroused suspicion, the car was
diverted for further investigation. A number of
individuals were cited when police found marijuana,
either in plain view or after a consensual
search of the vehicle.
The Minnesota scheme raises serious constitutional
questions. The state has a legitimate
interest in curbing the use of illegal drugs. However,
it is not clear that a narcotics-checkpoint
program is a valid means of promoting this
interest, in light of the privacy interest violated
by random questioning for investigation of drug
possession or use. Similarly, it is unclear whether
the Minnesota scheme is the type of minimal
intrusion that the Court sanctioned in Sitz. Still,
the Sitz and Acevedo decisions, both of which
have been criticized as giving too much discretion
to the police, indicate that the Court
intends to allow a great deal of latitude to law
enforcement officials in stopping and searching
automobiles under most conditions.
FURTHER READINGS
Blade, Bryan S. 1991. “Fourth Amendment—The Constitutionality
of a Sobriety Checkpoint Program.” Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology 81 (winter).
Braeske, Chris. 1993. “The Drug War Comes to a Highway
Near You: Police Power to Effectuate Highway ‘Narcotics
Checkpoints’ under the Federal and State Constitutions.”
Law and Inequality 11 (June).
Fisanick, Christian A. 2002. Vehicle Search Law Deskbook. St.
Paul, Minn.: Thomson/West.
Grant, Marguerite T., ed. 2003. Motor Vehicle Stops: Update
on the Law Governing Police Searches and Roadside
Questioning. Boston, Mass.: Massachusetts Continuing
Legal Education.
King, Lawrence T. 1988. “The Inventory Exception to the
Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement: Why the
Last in Should Be the First Out—or, Putting Opperman
and Bertine in Their Place.” American Journal of Trial
Advocacy 12 (fall).
Kole, Edward T. 1987. “Parked Motor Home Held to Be
within Scope of Automobile Exception to Warrant
Requirement—California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386
(1985).” Seton Hall Law Review 17 (summer).
Lally, Nicole C. 2000. “Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment
Protection Against Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures:Valid Automobile Search Includes a Passenger’s
Belongings.” Tennessee Law Review 67 (winter): 455–73.
Logan, Wayne A. 2002. “Street Legal: The Court Affords
Police Constitutional Carte Blanche.” Indiana Law Journal
77 (summer): 419–67.
Soden, Steven D. 1992. “Expansion of the ‘Automobile
Exception’ to the Warrant Requirement: Police Discretion
Replaces the ‘Neutral and Detached Magistrate.’”
Missouri Law Review 57 (spring).
CROSS-REFERENCES
Privacy; Drugs and Narcotics; Fourth Amendment; Probable
Cause; Search and Seizure; Search Warrant.

Automobile Searches: Is the Fourth Amendment in Jeopardy?

The right to move about freely without
fear of governmental interference
is one of the cornerstones of
democracy in America. Likewise, freedom
from governmental intrusions into
personal privacy is a cherished U.S. right.
Automobiles have come to symbolize
these rights in the United States, but freedom
and autonomy often conflict with
law enforcement’s interest in preserving
domestic order.
The FOURTH AMENDMENT to the
Constitution guarantees U.S.
citizens freedom from “unreasonable
searches and seizures.”
The Supreme Court, in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88
S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576
(1967), interpreted the Fourth
Amendment to mean that a
warrant issued by a “neutral and detached
magistrate” must be obtained before
police officers may lawfully search PERSONAL
PROPERTY. The Court in Katz
held that “searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval
by a judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions.”
In its struggle to balance the Fourth
Amendment’s personal privacy guarantees
with the government’s interest in
effective law enforcement, the Court has
allowed numerous exceptions to the warrant
requirement, prompting debate over
the amendment’s continued viability. A
particularly tricky area involves decisions
regarding warrantless automobile
searches.
Beginning with its decision in Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct.
280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925), the
Court has granted law enforcement
personnel substantial
latitude when searching automobiles
and their contents.
Carroll and its progeny established
that automobiles constitute
a distinct class of personal
property that deserves less privacy protection
than other types of property. The
Court has consistently held that because
a car and its contents are easily and
quickly moved, police officers need not
obtain a warrant to search them if they
reasonably believe that doing so would
result in lost evidence.
Since its decision in Carroll, the
Supreme Court has articulated several
rationales for allowing warrantless vehicle
searches. First, the Court followed
Carroll and held that a warrantless search
of an automobile is valid because of the
exigent circumstances involved (see, e.g.,
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.
Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 [1970]). Next,
the Court found that warrantless automobile
searches are justified because
individuals have a lower expectation of
privacy in their automobiles than in their
homes (see, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 94 S. Ct. 2464, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325
[1974] [plurality opinion]). Finally, the
Court extended the warrant exception to
containers found inside a vehicle, reasoning
that if the police could legally search
an automobile, they could also legally
search containers found in the automobile
(see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572
[1982]). However, the Court had previously
ruled that where a vehicle search
was illegal, a subsequent search of a suitcase
found inside the trunk of the vehicle
was also illegal (Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235
[1979]). The need to distinguish between
a Sanders situation and a Ross situation
caused some confusion, both for the police and for the courts. This need was
finally addressed by the Court in 1991.
Underlying all the exceptions to the
warrant requirement is the need to assist
law enforcement personnel without
unduly trampling on the Constitution.
However, some have argued that the pendulum
has swung too far in favor of
POLICE POWER. In 1991, the Court
extended the permissible scope of the
warrant exception with its decision in
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.
Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619, which upheld
the warrantless search of a bag found
inside the defendant’s vehicle. In an
attempt to clarify the law regarding warrantless
searches of containers found in
automobiles, the justices announced that
the Fourth Amendment does not require
a distinction between PROBABLE CAUSE
to search an entire vehicle, including containers
found inside (as in Ross), and
probable cause to search only a container
found inside an automobile (as in
Sanders). The Court announced a new
and succinct rule regarding automobile
searches: “The police may search an automobile
and the containers within it
where they have probable cause to believe
contraband or evidence is contained.”
The Acevedo decision provides what
is known as a bright-line rule, that is, a
RULE OF LAW that is clear and unequivocal.
But bright-line rules can obscure
the important nuances that surround an
issue. The Acevedo decision left little
doubt in the minds of law enforcement
personnel that they could, with probable
cause, search not only an automobile but
also any containers found inside. But
that clarity and the unfettered discretion
it gives the police trouble some legal analysts.
They assert that the ruling effectively
guts the Fourth Amendment as it
applies to automobile searches and, perhaps
more disturbing, that its reasoning
could and probably will be applied to
searches of other types of personal property.
Justice JOHN PAUL STEVENS noted
in his dissent to Acevedo that the majority’s
ruling creates the paradoxical situation
in which a container, such as a
briefcase, is not subject to a warrantless
search when it is carried in full view on a
public street but becomes subject to such
a search upon being placed inside an
automobile.
Critics of Acevedo also argue that it
contradicts earlier rationales established
to support exceptions to the warrant
requirement. In Acevedo, the Court
found no exigent circumstances to justify
the search, as it had in Carroll, since the
police could have legally seized the bag
and obtained a warrant for a later search.
Neither, assert critics, would the defendant’s
expectation of privacy in the bag
be diminished by virtue of his placing it
into the automobile.
Lacking both exigency and the lesser
expectation of privacy justifications, the
Court turned to policy considerations to
support its decision in Acevedo. The
majority stated that law enforcement personnel
were unnecessarily impeded by
the Court’s previous rulings on this issue.
The Court dismissed privacy concerns by
stating that protection of privacy is minimal
anyway, since in many automobile
search cases the police may legally search
a container under the “search-incidentto-
arrest” justification. Critics respond
that the policy underlying that exception
is that the police should be able to secure
the arrest site in order to protect their
safety; it does not follow that the police
should be allowed to search containers
even when they are not in danger.
Critics assert that by giving the police
the discretion to determine what is a reasonable
search, the Court ignored established
precedent governing Fourth
Amendment cases. Justice ROBERT H.
JACKSON wrote in Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948),
The point of the Fourth Amendment,
which is often not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it
denies law enforcement the support
of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw
from evidence. Its protection
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.
According to Justice Stevens, the
majority in Acevedo rejected this precedent
without justification.
Justice ANTONIN SCALIA took a different
approach. He suggested in his concurrence
to Acevedo that the Fourth
Amendment does not proscribe warrantless
searches but rather prohibits unreasonable
searches. Scalia argued that “the
supposed ‘general rule’ that a warrant is
always required does not appear to have
any basis in the common law.”
Lower federal courts and state courts
of appeals have struggled with the question
of whether Acevedo effectively
expands law enforcement officers’ ability
to search automobiles without a warrant.
For example, in United States v. Brooks,
838 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of
New York upheld the conviction of an
individual for distribution and conspiracy
to distribute cocaine after officers
conducted a warrantless search of the
defendant’s automobile. The officer, an
undercover police agent, knew that a
package contained cocaine, and the agent
and other officers observed the defendant
place the package in the front seat of the
car. Noting Scalia’s concurrence, the
Court distinguished between a warrantless
search and an unreasonable search.
Because the officer knew that the package
contained cocaine, the search of the automobile
for the package was reasonable.
Some state courts have invalidated
warrantless searches notwithstanding the
Acevedo decision, though even these
courts have struggled with the application
of the decision. In Green v. Indiana,
647 N.E.2d 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), officers
conducted surveillance of the defendant
at his home in Indiana based upon
reliable tips. The officers knew that the
defendant and another individual
planned to deliver cocaine from Texas to
Indiana after making a trip to Texas. The
officers anticipated that the defendant
would return in two days and reestablished
surveillance at a state highway in
Indiana. The officers did not obtain a
SEARCH WARRANT for the automobile,
though they had discussed the idea. The
officers stopped Green’s car upon his
return, arrested him, and conducted a
warrantless search of his automobile. The
officers discovered the cocaine during
their search. The court held that though
the officers had probable cause to conduct
the search, it was not impracticable
to secure a warrant, relying in part on the
Acevedo decision, the court held that
though the officer had probable cause to
conduct the search, it would not have
been impracticable for them to secure a
warrant, thus their failure to do so rendered
the search illegal.
FURTHER READINGS
Dressler, Joshua. 2002. Understanding Criminal
Procedure. Newark, N.J.: LexisNexis.
Gottlieb, Henry. 2002. “N.J. Joins Minority of
States that Ban Freewheeling Consent
Searches; Justices Invoke ‘Reasonable and
Articulable Suspicion’ Standard.” New Jersey
Law Journal 167 (March 18).
Saltzburg, Stephen A., et al. 2003. Basic Criminal
Procedure. St. Paul, Minn.: West
Group.
CROSS-REFERENCES
Privacy; Search and Seizure; Search Warrant.