ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW
A field of law relating to, and arising from, the
practice of the admiralty courts (tribunals that
exercise jurisdiction over all contracts, TORTS,
offenses, or injuries within maritime law) that
regulates and settles special problems associated
with sea navigation and commerce.
History of Admiralty and Maritime Law
The life of the mariner, spent far away from
the stability of land, has long been considered an
exotic one of travel, romance, and danger. Sto-
ries of pirates, mutinies, lashings, and hasty
trials—many of them true—illustrate the pecu-
liar, isolated nature of the maritime existence. In
modern times, the practice of shipping goods by
sea has become more civil, but the law still gives
maritime activities special treatment by
acknowledging the unique conflicts and difficul-
ties involved in high-seas navigation and com-
merce.
The roots of maritime law can be traced as
far back as 900 B.C. , which is when the Rhodian
Customary Law is believed to have been shaped
by the people of the island of Rhodes. The only
concept in the Rhodian Laws that still exists is
the law of jettison, which holds that if goods
must be thrown overboard (jettisoned) for the
safety of the ship or the safety of another’s prop-
erty, the owner of the goods is entitled to com-
pensation from the beneficiaries of the jettison.
Codes enacted by medieval port cities and
states have formed the current U.S. maritime
law. The eleventh-century Amalphitan Code, of
the Mediterranean countries; the fourteenth-
century Consolato del Mare, of France, Spain,
and Italy; the twelfth-century Roll of Oleron,
from England; and the thirteenth-century Law
of Visby all drew on the customs of mariners
and merchants to create the unique SUBSTAN-
TIVE LAW of admiralty that still exists today. Pro-
cedural differences existed between maritime cases and other civil proceedings until 1966, when the U.S. Supreme Court approved amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
that brought admiralty and maritime procedural
rules into accord with those used in other
civil suits. The substantive maritime law, however,
has remained intact.
Admiralty and Maritime Law in the Early 2000s
The terms admiralty and maritime law are
sometimes used interchangeably, but admiralty
originally referred to a specific court in England
and the American colonies that had jurisdiction
over torts and contracts on the high seas,
whereas substantive maritime law developed
through the expansion of admiralty court jurisdiction
to include all activities on the high seas
and similar activities on NAVIGABLE WATERS.
Because water commerce and navigation
often involve foreign nations, much of the U.S.
maritime law has evolved in concert with the
maritime laws of other countries. The federal
statutes that address maritime issues are often
customized U.S. versions of the convention resolutions
or treaties of international maritime
law. The UNITED NATIONS organizes and prepares
these conventions and treaties through branches
such as the International Maritime Organization
and the International Labor Organization,
which prepares conventions on the health,
safety, and well-being of maritime workers.
The substance of maritime law considers the
dangerous conditions and unique conflicts
involved in navigation and water commerce.
Sailors are especially vulnerable to injury and
sickness owing to a variety of conditions, such as
drastic changes in climate, constant peril, hard
labor, and loneliness. Under the Shipowners’
Liability Convention (54 Stat. 1693 [1939]), a
shipowner may be liable for the maintenance
and cure of sailors injured on ship and for
injuries occurring on land. Courts have construed
accidents occurring during leave as being
the responsibility of the shipowner because
sailors need land visits in order to endure the
long hours of water transportation.
Assigning responsibility for onboard NEGLIGENCE
was a long-standing problem, but the
JONES ACT of 1920 (46 U.S.C.A. § 688 et seq.)
solidifies the right of sailors to recover from an
employer for injuries resulting from the negligence
of the employer, a master, or another crew
member. The 1920 Death on High Seas Act (46
App. U.S.C.A. § 761 et seq.) allows recovery by
the beneficiaries of a sailor’s estate when the
sailor dies by negligence, default, or wrongful act
on the high seas “beyond a marine league from
the shore of any state [territory or dependency].”
A marine league is one-twentieth of a
degree of latitude, or three miles.
Accidents suffered by nonmaritime persons
on docks, piers, wharfs, or bridges do not qualify
for the application of maritime law principles.
However, personal injuries suffered while
individuals were aboard a ship or as a result of
an air-to-water airplane crash are considered
within the jurisdiction of admiralty law.
The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act (33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq.
[1927]) sets up a federal system to compensate
injured maritime workers who do not sail.
Through the Federal Office of Workers’ Compensation
Programs, employees such as stevedores
(workers who load and unload ships) and
ship service operators can receive compensation
for injuries suffered in the course of their
employment.U.S. sailors benefit from Title 46 of
the U. S. Code, which sets a schedule for sailors’
earnings and the conditions of their contracts.
Title 46 also lists the qualifications for sailor
employment (§§ 7301 et seq.), the hours and
conditions of the employment (§§ 8104 et seq.),
and the living conditions that must be provided
(§§ 11101 et seq.).
Federal laws also address the problems that
beset ships and the life-or-death decisions made
by carriers. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1300–1315 [1936]) regulates the
rights, responsibilities, liabilities, and immunities
regarding the relationship between shippers
and carriers of goods. The Salvage Act (46
U.S.C.A. §§ 727–731 [1912]) provides for compensation
to persons who help save a ship or
cargo from danger or help recover a ship or
cargo from actual loss. To qualify for salvage
remuneration, a person must not be acting in
service of the ship or in performance of a contract,
and the help given must have contributed
at least in part to a wholly or partially successful
salvage of the ship or goods.
The case law of the United States is rich in
the areas of sailors’ rights respecting the unseaworthiness
of vessels, compensation for vessel
suppliers and servicers, and the liabilities arising
from collisions, towage, pilotage, and groundings.
The Maritime Lien Act (46 U.S.C.A. §§
31341–31343 [1920]) gives a lien to any person
who, upon the order of the shipowner, furnishes repairs, supplies, towage, use of dry dock or
marine railway, or other necessaries to any vessel,
without allegation or proof that credit was
given. The Ship Mortgage Act (46 U.S.C.A.
§§ 31301–31330 [1920]) regulates the mortgages
on ships registered in the United States,
and also provides for enforcement of the maritime
liens obtained through the Maritime Lien
Act.
In case of collision or other damage to a vessel,
an in rem proceeding is often used to recover
damages. An in rem action is a lawsuit brought
against an offending thing (in admiralty, usually
the ship), whereas an in personam action is a
suit brought against a person. Rule C of the Supplemental
Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime
Claims (1985) provides necessary details
for the seizure of an offending owner’s vessel or
property if a defendant vessel owner does not
live in the state in which a suit is brought. The
practical effect of Supplemental Rules B to E is
to make it easier for a plaintiff to bring actions
against out-of-state and foreign vessel owners
and to provide for the attachment and GARNISHMENT
of the offending vessel.
An important consideration in any lawsuit is
venue. Under Article III, Section 2, of the U.S.
Constitution, federal courts have the power to
try “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction”
(art. III, sec. 2). However, state courts
can also hear admiralty and maritime cases by
virtue of the “saving-to-suitors” clause of 28
U.S.C.A. § 1333(1). This clause allows a plaintiff
to sue in state court through an ordinary civil
action when the court’s COMMON LAW is competent
to give a remedy. In such actions, the state
court must apply the federal law of admiralty to
the admiralty claims. Nevertheless, if a plaintiff
believes he or she will fare better before a local
tribunal, the option is available.
When no applicable federal statute exists,
the governing law of a maritime case will be the
uniform laws as expounded by the U.S. Supreme
Court and applicable to all torts and contracts, whether the case is tried in federal or state court.
Maritime case law—not the general common
law—will govern a contract dispute only if the
subject matter of the contract pertained to water
commerce. Maritime precedents will govern a
tort claim only if the negligent or reckless
actions involved commercial activity on navigable
waters.
Charter parties are often a topic of concern
in maritime law. A charter party, or charter, is an
agreement among a shipowner, a crew (the charterer),
and the owner of the goods to be transported.
Charter parties come in three types:
time, voyage, and demise. A time charter is the
lease of a ship to a charterer for a specified
period of time. A voyage charter is the lease of a
ship for a specific number of voyages. A demise
charter (so called because the shipowner effectively
relinquishes ownership for a certain
period, causing a “demise” in ownership interest)
is usually a bareboat charter, which means
that the charterer supplies the master and crew
for the ship. Other demise charters provide that
the shipowner’s master and crew take charge of
the vessel.
In contrast to the usual contract practice of
providing risk-of-loss insurance for one party,
charters utilize what is called a general average.
General average is the traditional, primitive form
of maritime risk allocation whereby all participants
in a charter agree to share any damages
resulting from an unsuccessful voyage. Most
parties to a charter obtain insurance to cover
their portion of risk. However, because a charter
involves multiple parties, and because insurance
policies are subject to interpretation, insurance
coverage does not always prevent disputes over
damages.
Risk of loss is sometimes decided according
to a bill of lading. This document confirms a
carrier’s receipt of goods from the owner (consignor),
verifies the voyage contract, and shows
rightful ownership of the goods. In Lekas & Drivas,
Inc. v. Goulandris, 306 F.2d 426 (2d Cir.
1962), the SS Ioannis P. Goulandris had chartered
to carry olive oil, cheese, and tobacco from
the western Greek port of Piraiévs to the United
States via the Strait of Gibraltar. On October 28,
1940, with the Ioannis docked in Piraiévs, Italy
attacked Greece, and the Ioannis was requisitioned
by the Greek government for a military
mission.
On November 10, 1940, the Ioannis finally
set sail with its cargo for the United States via the
Suez Canal and the Red Sea, and around Cape
Horn. After an arduous journey that included
two crossings of the equator, hull damage, and
lengthy repairs, the Ioannis came into port at
Norfolk, Virginia, on May 3, 1941. En route, the
tobacco had been damaged, much of the olive
oil had leaked from its drums, and the cheese
was “‘[m]elted with a terrible stench, and
worthless.’”
Despite the Ioannis’s brave participation in
wartime activities, the intended recipients (consignees)
of the tobacco and olive oil sued the
Ioannis and were able to recover for the losses
suffered as a result of the damage. However, on
the subject of the cheese, the court refused to
allow recovery by Lekas and Drivas, which had
consigned the cheese to itself.
Lekas argued that the crew of the Ioannis
was negligent in storing the cheese in the structure
at the stern above the main deck, known as
the poop. According to Lekas, it was inappropriate
for the cheese to be in the poop. The poop
lacked ventilation, and it was not refrigerated.
However, according to the bill of lading between
Lekas and the Ioannis, special cooling was not
necessary and had not been contracted for. The
cheese was also stored on lighters (large, flat-bottomed
barges used for loading and unloading
ships) during the 35 days needed for repairs of
the Ioannis, and Lekas claimed that this storage
was improper. But because wartime conditions
were responsible for the length of repairs and
the lack of proper storage space for the cheese,
the court ultimately held that the Ioannis was
not negligent in its handling of the cheese.
In addition to the state and federal governments,
municipalities can affect the private
enjoyment of maritime activity. In Beveridge v.
Lewis, 939 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1991), appellants
Richard Beveridge, Peter Murray,Gregory Davis,
and Peter Eastman challenged a Santa Barbara
city ordinance (Santa Barbara Municipal Code §
17.13.020) that prohibited the anchoring or
mooring of boats within 300 feet of Stearns
Wharf from December to March. Santa Barbara
had acquired ownership of Stearns Wharf in
1983, passed the ordinance in 1984, and started
issuing citations for noncompliance shortly
thereafter. Beveridge, Murray, Davis, and Eastman
all owned boats moored or anchored
within 300 feet of Stearns Wharf, and the four,
represented by Eastman, brought suit against
the city in 1989, seeking injunctive relief against
enforcement of the ordinance.
At trial, Eastman argued that the Santa Barbara
ordinance conflicted with the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA) (33
U.S.C.A. §§ 1221 et seq.), a federal act designed
to reduce the loss of vessels and cargo, protect
marine environment, prevent damage to structures
on or adjacent to navigable waters, and
ensure compliance with vessel operation and
safety standards. The trial court dismissed the
case, reasoning that the ordinance was neither
preempted by, nor in conflict with, the federal
statute.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed that the Santa Barbara ordinance
was not in conflict with the PWSA, because the
federal act was not intended to limit a municipality’s
control over its local shores. The appeals
court also rejected the proposition that the
enactment of the PWSA implicitly foreclosed
the enactment of similar ordinances by municipalities,
and Santa Barbara’s control over the
Stearns Wharf was complete.
Admiralty and maritime matters will always
deserve laws carefully crafted to suit the complexity
and urgency of maritime endeavors. The
international nature of high-seas navigation and
its attendant perils demand no less. Federal,
state, and local control of navigable waters can
affect everyone from the largest charter party to
a private boat owner.
FURTHER READINGS
Healy, Nicholas J. 1999. Cases and Materials on Admiralty. 3d
ed. St. Paul,Minn.:West Group.
Lucas, Jo Desha. 2003. Admiralty: Cases and Materials. 5th
ed. New York: Foundation Press.
Robertson, David W. 2001. Admiralty and Maritime Law in
the United States. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic
Press.
Schoenbaum, Thomas J. 2001. Admiralty and Maritime Law.
3d ed. St. Paul,Minn.:West Group.
CROSS-REFERENCES
Carriers; Environmental Law; Navigable Rivers; Piracy; Salvage;
Shipping Law; Territorial Waters.
