ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
The concept under which a federal court exercises its discretion and equitable powers and declines to decide a legal action over which it has jurisdiction pursuant to the Constitution and statutes where the state judiciary is capable of rendering a definitive ruling in the matter.
The abstention doctrine was adopted by the Supreme Court to allow the federal judiciary to refrain from ruling on constitutional questions. Because it has no explicit source in federal or state laws, it is the exception to the general rule that a litigant may sue or be sued in federal court if the federal court has jurisdiction, or power to hear the case. A federal court has jurisdiction over several species of cases and controversies, such as those involving a federal constitutional question, a federal statute, or litigants of different states in a dispute totaling over $50,000 (in which case, the court’s power to hear is called diversity jurisdiction). Federal courts have an obligation to hear the cases properly brought before them, so abstention is an extraordinary judicial maneuver.
Also known as the Pullman doctrine, the abstention doctrine was first fashioned by the Court in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 61 S. Ct. 643, 85 L. Ed. 971 (1941). At issue in Pullman was a Texas Railroad Commission regulation that prevented the operation of sleeping cars on trains without a Pullman conductor. Before the regulation, Texas trains used only one sleeping car in areas of light passenger traffic. When only one sleeping car was used, the trains had only Pullman porters to watch over the sleepers. When more sleeping cars were used, the trains employed Pullman conductors, who supervised the porters. The regulation eliminated a practice that deprived conductors of wages, but it also effectively decreased the earnings and eliminated the autonomy of porters. This result introduced the issue of discrimination, since, at the time, Pullman conductors were white and porters were black.
The Pullman Company and Texas railroads objected to the regulation, and together they brought suit in federal district court to keep the commission from enforcing the order. Pullman porters joined the Pullman Company and the railroads as complainants, and Pullman conductors joined the commission as defendants. The federal district court granted the request of the complainants, ruling that the commission did not have the authority to make such an order. The defendants appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The complainants argued that the regulation violated constitutional rights, namely the protections provided under the DUE PROCESS and commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The porters specifically asserted that the order was discriminatory against “negroes,” and thus violated the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT to the Constitution. The commission answered that its authority to order such a regulation was created by Texas law. Vernon’s Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated, article 6445, provided in part that the commission was empowered to prevent “unjust discrimination . . . and to prevent any and all other abuses” in the Texas railroad industry.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the sensitive nature of the porters’ allegation of discrimination, but declared that the fate of the offending law should be decided first by the state courts. The Court then faced the question of whether a state resolution was possible.
The Supreme Court noted that a federal district court in the Fifth Circuit had ruled against
the commission, but called the decision nothing more than a “forecast.” According to the Court, the Texas state courts were more capable of interpreting Texas laws and determining how they should be applied. Federal courts were simply not competent to define the concept of discrimination and its prevention as understood in Texas.
Furthermore, deciding Texas law in a federal court was of little use when the ruling could later be displaced by the decision of a state court. The Court conceded that federal constitutional claims against state laws or regulations may be appealed to federal courts, but it emphasized the public interest in avoiding “needless friction with state policies.” This meant that when a state had the means to resolve a constitutional issue, the first word on the meaning and constitutionality of the challenged law should be left to the state.
Texas law provided for JUDICIAL REVIEW of administrative orders in state court, so the complainants could have filed suit there. Likewise, the defendants could have brought suit in state court to enforce the order in the event of a railroad strike. Because these avenues existed and had
not been traveled, the Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the lower federal court and
ordered the case held in the federal court pend-
ing the outcome of state proceedings.
The abstention doctrine has expanded since
the Pullman case. The Supreme Court has iden-
tified three distinct types of cases from which a
federal court should abstain: (1) If the meaning
of a state law or regulation is claimed to be
unconstitutional, and the meaning of the statute
or regulation can be discovered in the state’s
court system, abstention is appropriate. (2)
Abstention is also appropriate when a federal
suit seeks to delay or upset an ongoing state pro-
ceeding, such as a criminal prosecution or the
collection of state taxes. (3) Finally, a federal
court should yield to state courts when a case
presents a difficult policy question of vital
importance to the state. This last justification for
abstention breeds the most creative arguments.
One difficult issue of vital importance to
states is domestic relations. DIVORCE, ALIMONY,
and CHILD CUSTODY cases involve legitimate
local policies concerning marriage and religion.
Until the 1990s, domestic relations abstention
has been invoked by federal courts in virtually
any case concerning family members. In Anken-
brandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 112 S. Ct. 2206,
119 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1992), the Supreme Court put
a stop to this practice.
On September 26, 1989, Carol Ankenbrandt,
on behalf of her daughters, sued Jon Richards
and Debra Kesler in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana. Ankenbrandt,
a Missouri citizen, had been married to
Richards, a Louisiana citizen. After the couple
divorced, Richards became romantically
involved with Kesler. In her suit, Ankenbrandt
claimed that Richards and Kesler had sexually
and physically abused Ankenbrandt’s daughters.
Ankenbrandt filed the suit in federal court under diversity jurisdiction; she was able to do so because she did not live in the defendants’home state and she was suing for over $50,000.
The federal court decided not to hear themerits of Ankenbrandt’s case. The district courtgranted the defendants’ earliest motion to dismiss,ruling that the case belonged in state courtunder the domestic relations exception to federaljurisdiction based on diversity. As an alternativeto that holding, the court declared that itsrefusal to hear the case was also justified by theabstention doctrine. The court of appealsaffirmed these holdings without a publishedopinion.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed thedecision. The Court traced the origins of thedomestic relations exception to federal diversityjurisdiction and concluded that the exceptionwas valid. Nevertheless, the exception contemplatedfederal abstention only from cases such asdivorce, alimony, and child custody. Ankenbrandt’saction was a tort action, an action formonetary recovery based on the accusations ofone individual against another. Ankenbrandt’sprevious marriage to Richards did not provide apermissible reason for the federal court toinvoke the domestic relations exception.
The federal district court’s alternative holdingof abstention was equally erroneous. Thedistrict court had cited Younger v. Harris, 401U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971), assupport for its abstention. However, the Youngerdecision simply held that a federal court couldnot interfere with a pending state criminal prosecution.Here, no state proceeding was pending,and the defense had not alleged that any importantSTATE INTEREST existed, so reliance on thatparticular reason for abstention was misplaced.
Although the argument had not been raisedby Richards or Kesler, the Supreme Court anticipatedanother reason for abstention, to foreclosethe argument in future cases. The federaldistrict court may have sought to abstain fromthe Ankenbrandt case because the suit seemed topresent a difficult state policy question of vitalimportance to the public. The case seemed toinvolve a determination of the family status ofthe litigants, an area of state interest that couldbring the case within the domestic relationsexception. This basis for abstention was not supportable,though, because the familial status ofthe parties had already been determined in adivorce proceeding and a parental rights proceeding.
The Supreme Court further warned that thefamily status of the litigants had no bearing onthe underlying case. In a civil action for monetarydamages, where sexual and physical abuse isalleged, a federal court could not refuse to hearthe case because the litigants had at one timebeen related. Ultimately, neither the domesticrelations exception nor its close relative theabstention doctrine would deprive Ankenbrandtof the right to file her complaint in federal court.
Despite its expansion since Pullman, federal court abstention is very rare. A federal court may refuse to hear a case over which it has jurisdiction only in unusual circumstances. When a case poses federal constitutional questions, a federal court may abstain only when the challenged state law or regulation is unclear. In addition, the methods for determining the meaning of the law or regulation must exist in the state’s court system, and these methods must not have been used. Then and only then may a federal court refrain from hearing a constitutional question. The boundaries of the abstention doctrine are continually tested and stretched, but in 1992 the Supreme Court sent notice through the Ankenbrandt case to the federal courts that itsuse is limited.
CROSS-REFERENCES
Constitutional Law; Courts; Federal Courts.
